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ABSTRACT 
  
Gender and sex are often conflated.  Our laws, policies, and even science establish 
sex and gender as intrinsically linked and dimorphic in nature.  This dissertation 
examines the relationship between sex and gender and the repercussions of this linked 
dimorphism in the realms of law, politics, and science.  Chapter One identifies the legal 
climate for changing one's sexual identity post-surgical reassignment.  It pays particular 
attention to the ability of postsurgical transsexuals to marry in their acquired sex.  
Chapter Two considers the process for identifying the sex of athletes for the purposes of 
participation in sex-segregated athletic events, specifically the role of testing and 
standards for categorization.  Chapter Three explores the process of identifying and 
assigning the sex of intersex children.  Chapter Four examines the process of prenatal sex 
selection and its ethical implications.  Chapter Four also offers an anticipatory 
governance framework to address these implications. 
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PREFACE 
 In the beginning, I would like to set a context for how I came to this topic-- the 
questions that shaped this project, and why I pursued them. 
 My dissertation initially developed from the work I was doing with Dave Guston 
at the Center for Nanotechnology in Society (CNS) starting in 2005.   Our work at CNS 
centered on the ethical, political, and policy dimensions of nanotechnology, 
transhumanism, and human enhancement technology.  In part, the research focused on 
tracing an issue in the discourse about transhumanism and human enhancement 
technology that was leading to a seeming divide.  On one end were a group of individuals 
who spoke about scientific technological development as being problematic, either 
neoludites or those who had religious objections to transhumanism or human 
enhancement technology.  This included people like Leon Kass and Francis Fukuyama.  
They often advocated banning practices they found objectionable or immoral.  On the 
other end was a libertarian approach to human enhancement and nanotech research.  This 
camp advocated permitting people to enhance their bodies as they see fit and permitting 
unfettered scientific development.  In response we developed a chapter on anticipatory 
governance which began to link the two sides by looking to anticipate and regulate the 
issues that led to undesirable use of technology, rather than the use of the technology 
itself.  In this work, I encountered men and women who had traditions expanding beyond 
the science and technology realm to include political philosophy, political theory, and 
ethics.  This perspective became central to my thinking, and my work with CNS 
transformed some of my academic interests.  I was inspired to consider a project that 
would look at how technological developments shaped our political outcomes.   
 vi 
 One of the concerns we saw over and over again as we attended conferences or 
saw speeches or presentations in science and technology ethics studies was the 
speculative nature of discussing transhumanism and human enhancement technology.  
The research was being denigrated as hyperbolic, science fiction, contrived, and 
unnecessary.  To counter this, I became interested in the way those technologies were 
having effects today rather than speculating about technological developments that could 
occur.  In particular, I was interested in the way that technological developments impact 
identity politics and our traditional notions of justice--how justice interplays with people's 
ability to transform themselves and how those transformations and interactions with 
technology give them some political credence, ability or power within society.  Are these 
technological changes politically and legally recognized?  Are these transformations 
known and understood?  How do we govern them?  What is the interplay between 
politics and technology?  What are the ethical dimensions or repercussions of these 
decisions?  In that realm, I became particularly fascinated with questions of sex and 
gender. 
 Looking to the works of Foucault and Hankins, one can see that ordering systems 
are omnipresent in our society and create mechanisms by which to categorize 
everything.
1
  Categories identify and separate groups of people and often carry significant 
political force.
2
  Indeed, the management of these categories, particularly when they 
convey political and social dimensions, shapes life’s opportunities.  The category of race 
                                                 
1
   For a strong argument on the human propensity for ordering, see Michel Foucault, The Order of 
Things: An Archeology of the Human Sciences (Vintage Books 1994) (1966); Thomas L. Hankins, Science 
and the Enlightenment (1985).  
2
   Foucault, supra note 1; Hankins, supra note 1. 
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is a prime example of what a serious and complex issue categorizing people can be.
3
  
Before the late 1960s in the United States, race commonly determined citizens’ ability to 
vote, the schools they could attend, and even which water fountains they could drink 
from.  Rationales for categorizing people by race ranged from scientific evidence to 
common knowledge.
4
 
 Identity politics sees these groups as socially constructed.  Our conception of 
what it means to be Hispanic or a woman is not founded primarily on biological 
distinction, but based on legal, political, and social standards for categorizing and 
identifying people.  These categories are then defined both by what attributes are 
identifiable within the group and what attributes exclude a person from the dominant 
group.  The production of these identities forms the heart of how we see ourselves and 
each other. 
 The production of identity has traditionally been seen as stemming from the 
dominant power.  Those in control define the parameters of who is a part of the dominant 
group and who is excluded.  Traditionally the most powerful group in Western society is 
white, male, heterosexual, and propertied.  All others are seen in relation to this 
politically powerful group.  Definitions begin to produce what is other than white, male, 
heterosexual, and propertied.  So, African-Americans are defined by what makes them 
not white.  The non-white characteristics--darkness of skin, the kink of hair-- demark 
                                                 
3
   See Ian Haney Lόpez, White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race (10th anniversary ed. 2006). 
Haney Lόpez outlines how Supreme Court decisions forge the definition of the White race. Lόpez traces the 
Justices’ rationales for their decisions—ranging from scientific evidence and common knowledge to legal 
precedence and congressional decisions. Lόpez contends that classification as White or not White, 
particularly as related to the beneficiaries of immigration law, is a significant political determination with 
critical impacts on the agency of individuals based upon their White/not White categorization.  
4
   Id. 
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who is African-American.  But, these biological characteristics are not the limit of 
defining African-American as "other."  Social attributes or quasi-biological 
characteristics are also ascribed to the group.  For example, African-Americans may be 
considered physically stronger, better singers, and less intellectually capable than the 
dominant group.  The powerful group defines these identities as a way to segregate 
groups and identify them as inferior.   
 As the social construction of identity has been exposed, identity groups have 
started to create meaning for the groups themselves.  Rather than seeing themselves as 
restricted by the identity constructed by the majority culture, minority identity groups 
have started to construct new meaning for their own identity.  For example, many 
feminists have embraced the identity of women and worked to construct a more positive 
political position for themselves.  By embracing their identity the goal becomes to 
provide a place for women in the political, legal, and social world.  Negative attributes 
were re-conceptualized as positive and embraced.  For example, women's propensity for 
caring and nurturing which was connected to the biological role of women as mothers 
and once used as justification for excluding women from public life was given political 
capital under an argument that women are more empathetic and therefore more capable 
of creating laws and policies that positively impact people's lives.  It is the social 
significance of embracing an identity "oppositional to the prevailing norm" that creates 
"political potential."
5
 
  
                                                 
5
   Stevi Jackson, Sexual Politics: Feminist Politics, Gay Politics and the Problem of Heterosexuality, 
in POLITICS OF SEXUALITY: IDENTITY, GENDER, CITIZENSHIP 87 (Terrell Carver & Veronique Mottier ed., 
1998) 
 ix 
 Sex and gender issues piqued my interest in particular because we generally 
conceive of gender as something changeable.  Our interactions with others are malleable 
and a person can be increasingly masculine or feminine based on personal decisions at 
any given time.  We conceive of gender as socially constructed, constructed by 
interactions with others and societal expectations.  Men are supposed to wear pants.  
There is nothing biological that divines that men ought to wear pants or need to wear 
pants, but instead that is the custom in most Western societies.  So we follow that custom.   
 On the other hand we generally think of sex as something rigid, biological, and 
determined by nature rather than something that is socially constructed.  There are a 
group of political philosophers, political theorists, and others that have discussed the 
possibility that sex itself is socially constructed.  The works of Judith Butler are 
particularly important here.  Butler argues that sex itself is constructed socially because 
the bodies that we represent--the way we represent our physical form-- is based on 
societal expectations.  Society determines what a feminine body is supposed to look like 
and what a masculine body is supposed to look like.  Butler has a notion of gender being 
a performance of a person's sex.  So rather than simply speaking about these things as 
constructed on the gender end; we may also talk about them as constructed on the sex 
end.   
  This led me to consider the prevailing dimorphism of sex and gender.  Sex 
dimorphism is the view that there are two separate, well-defined, and distinguishable 
sexes.  The dimorphic view iterates various categories for distinguishing individuals.  
There may be various biological categories, such as: 
1. Primary sex characteristics (sexual organs – phenotypical)  
 x 
2. Secondary sex characteristics (sex differentiation at puberty – phenotypical)  
3. Hormonal sex characteristics (generation and use of primarily oestrogens or 
androgens) 
4. Gonadal sex characteristics (presence of ovaries and testes – reproductive role)  
5. Chromosomal sex characteristics (human X or Y combinations – genetics)  
6. Brain structures and functions (characteristics generally vary by sex)  
7. Gender identity (psychological sense of self in regard to gender typing).6     
 
But, dimorphism extends beyond physical or biological characteristics to gender roles.  A 
dimorphic view categorizes the two sexes as being divergent and distinguishable along 
these lines.  So, a person is either distinctly male/masculine/man or 
female/feminine/woman.      
 Judith Butler challenges the project of feminist theory for a series of reasons.  
Among her criticisms is the formation of a monolithic gender identity of women.
7
  The 
existence of this identity is both criticized by feminists as a source of oppression and used 
as a starting point for overcoming political oppression.  "For the most part, feminist 
theory has assumed that there is some existing identity, understood through the category 
of women, who not only initiates feminist interest and goals within discourse, but 
                                                 
6
   Tere Prasse, Medical Sex v. Social Gender: Tried in the Court of Human Knowledge and 
Experience, the 21
st
 Century CE. (2000), http://christielee.net/med3.htm 
7
   Part of Butler's concern is about intersectionality.  A monolithic conception of gender ignores the 
differences between say an urban, heterosexual, African-American woman and a rural, white, lesbian 
woman.  In addition, a monolithic approach ignores differences of culture, history, technological 
advancement, and religion that may make remarkable differences in conceptions of what it may mean to be 
a "woman."      
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constitutes the subject for whom political representation is pursued."
8
  Butler contends 
that feminism's embrace of women as a category was necessitated by the desire to engage 
in political discourse.  "For feminist theory, the development of a language that fully or 
adequately represents women has seemed necessary to foster political visibility of 
women.  This has seemed obviously important considering the pervasive cultural 
condition in which women's lives were either misrepresented or not represented at all."
9
 
 But the struggle for representation has allowed for power to be placed in legal and 
political hands that help to define and limit what the identity category means and 
represents.  "Juridical notions of power appear to regulate political life in purely negative 
terms -- that is, through the limitations, prohibition, regulation, control, and even 
'protection' of individuals related to that political structure through the contingent and 
retractable operation of choice."
10
  Identity creates boundaries within which individuals 
are allowed to operate.  Identity becomes a limit on the actions of an individual.  "But the 
subjects regulated by such structures are, by virtue of being subjected to them, formed, 
defined, and reproduced in accordance with the requirements of those structures."
11
  For 
Butler the law and politics create the boundaries of identity by defining what is not a part 
of the category.  "[T]he political construction of the subject proceeds with certain 
legitimating and exclusionary aims, and these political operations are effectively 
concealed and naturalized by political analysis that takes juridical structures as their 
                                                 
8
   Judith Butler, Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire, in Feminism and Politics, 273 (ed. Anne Phillips 
1998).   
9
   Id. at 273 
10
   Id. at 274 
11
   Id. 
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foundation."
12
  The limits that the law and policy place on identity are constructed as 
occurring naturally rather than artificially.  "Juridical power inevitably 'produces' what it 
claims to merely represent."
13
   The law is then seen as working within those natural 
foundations rather than producing them.  "In effect, the law produces and then conceals 
the notion of 'a subject before the law' in order to invoke the discursive formation as a 
naturalized foundational premise that subsequently legitimates the law's own regulatory 
hegemony."
14
 
 For Butler feminist liberation is only possible when feminists understand how the 
feminine is constructed in law and policy.  "Feminist critique ought also to understand 
how the category of 'women,' the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by the 
very structures of power through which emancipation is sought."
15
  For Butler feminism 
requires exposing this structure and attacking the identities that are produced within the 
structure.  "[The political] task is to formulate within this constituted frame a critique of 
the categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, and 
immobilize."
16
For Butler the danger in untangling sex from gender is the perception that 
gender is malleable while sex is rigid and that gender can be disassociated from sex.  
Butler contests the concept of sex is rigid and fixed.  "If the immutable character of sex is 
contested, perhaps this construct called 'sex' is as culturally constructed as gender."
17
 
                                                 
12
   Id. 
13
   Id. 
14
   Id. at 275 
15
   Id. 
16
   Id. at 277 
17
   Id. at 279 
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 Butler argues that sex and gender form a cohesive connection, where both sex and 
gender are constructed together and in terms of one another. 
18
  Butler sees gender as a 
performance of sex.
19
  The normative standards for performing gender correctly are 
intimately connected with the normative standards for the appearance of the body that 
corresponds with that gender.
20
  For Butler bodies matter when they are categorized 
“within the productive constraints of certain highly gendered regulatory schemas.”21  The 
gender-sex link is important because it creates bodies that have physical and social 
attributes that are seen to be beneficial to society.
22
  Exposing this framework for Butler 
is part of feminist liberation.  
 But challenging the production of sex is not intuitive precisely because it is 
constructed as natural.  Sex, in many ways, is the ultimate category for distinguishing and 
categorizing individuals, because it is seen as a scientific category—not a socially 
constructed category, but a function of biology.
23
 
 Nonetheless, even as a “scientific” category, sex is often not clearly delineated.  
For example, it is estimated that nearly two percent of children are born intersex—not 
                                                 
18
   Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, (1990). 
19
   Id.  
20
   Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of “Sex,” (1993).   
21
   Id. at xi. 
22
   Id. 
23
   See Howard Garfinkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology 122–28 (1967). More credence is given to the 
view of race, ethnicity, and nationality as social categories. See e.g., Benedict Anderson, Imagined 
Communities (rev. ed. 2006) (describing the social construction of nationality). There is significant 
discussion on the performance and construction of sex. See e.g., Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the 
Discursive Limits of “Sex” (1993). Nonetheless, it appears that sex is considered more rigidly biological 
than social. See e.g., Sally Raskoff, Everyday Sociology Blog, The Social Construction of Race, Ethnicity, 
Sex, and Gender, http://nortonbooks.typepad.com/everydaysociology/2009/03/the-social-construction-of-
race-ethnicity-sex-and-gender.html (Mar. 25, 2009). 
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belonging entirely to either the male or female sex.
24
  Other people are born as a member 
of one biological sex, but have the identity of the opposite sex—this is known as gender 
identity disorder.
25
 
 Gender identity disorder, as classified by the International Statistical 
Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems, is a mental disorder defined as:  
A desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually 
accompanied by a sense of discomfort with, or inappropriateness of, one's 
anatomic sex, and a wish to have surgery and hormonal treatment to make one's 
body as congruent as possible with one's preferred sex.
26
 
                                                 
24
   Anne Fausto-Sterling, Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality51(2000). 
The general medical practice for children who are intersex is surgical alteration at birth and assignment to 
one of the two sexes. Elizabeth Weil, What if It’s (Sort of) a Boy and (Sort of) a Girl?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
24, 2006 (Magazine), at 48. This standard medical practice is generally necessitated by the need to provide 
sex identification on the birth certificate as a legal requirement. The decision to assign the sex of the child 
at birth has been challenged in court in the United Kingdom. A British court held that sex assignment 
surgery is preferable to non-surgery because not assigning a sex would leave the child in social and legal 
limbo. See W. v. W. (Physical Inter-sex) [2001] Fam. 111. In 2006, fifty international experts on intersex 
children signed The Consensus Statement on the Management of Intersex Disorders, contending that a 
child’s sex should still be assigned as soon as possible, but discouraging doctors and families of intersex 
children from having surgery right away. Christopher P. Houk et al., Summary of Consensus Statement on 
Intersex Disorders and Their Management, 118 Pediatrics 755 (2006). 
25
   An estimate on the percentage of people who have gender identity disorder is difficult to attain. 
See, e.g., Jonathan V. Last, She ain’t necessarily so: Jonathan V. Last takes us to the newest frontier in 
sexual politics—transgender chic, Women’s Q., Summer 2002, at 4.  
26
   World Health Org. (WHO), International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems, ch. 5, § F64.0 (10th rev., 2007), http://apps.who.int/classifications/apps/icd/icd10online/. 
Published by the World Health Organization, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems establishes a coding system for categorizing diseases and a wide variety of signs, 
symptoms, abnormal findings, complaints, social circumstances, and external causes of injury or disease. 
This system is designed to promote international comparability in the collection, processing, classification, 
and presentation of these statistics and to help in the diagnosis of diseases. The system is widely used for 
purposes of statistical comparability and standardized diagnosis. The International Statistical Classification 
includes a section classifying mental and behavioral disorders, which was developed alongside the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders(“DSM”); the 
two manuals seek to use the same codes. They represent the primary mental health diagnosis systems 
worldwide. The DSM, which is the United States’  separate diagnostic manual, is connected to the 
International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems but uses slightly different 
standards that more closely approximate U.S. practices. The DSM provides four criteria for gender identity 
disorder: (1) “[S]trong and persistent cross-gender identification,” (2) “[P]ersistent discomfort about one’s 
assigned sex or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex,” (3) “The diagnosis is not made 
if the individual has a concurrent physical intersex condition," and (4) “[C]linically significant distress or 
 xv 
There are two important predicates in the diagnosis of gender identity disorder.  First, 
gender identity disorder is based upon a desire to live as a member of the opposite sex.
27
  
Thus, the medical community focuses on the congruence between the person’s self-
identified and biological sexes.  Second, after psychological evaluation, doctors often 
recommend a sex change operation along with hormone therapy.
28
 
 Engaging in speculative discussion of the production of gender and sex is not 
sufficient for understanding either the underlying mechanism or its repercussions.  
Examining the very systems at play in constructing sex and gender is necessary to 
understand both the construction of these terms and their relationship, which I do in this 
dissertation.  
 But I am also interested in the role that science has in the production of sex as a 
natural and well defined category.  In the lay community, science is often thought of as 
rigid, logical, and well defined.  Because sex is a scientific category it is presumed to be 
fixed.  But the fixed view of sex may merely be a result of our attempts to place all 
bodies into a defined category.  Thomas Khun noted this problem as occurring in "normal 
science," the third and final phase of a shifting paradigm.
29
  Khun contended that in 
normal science contradictory evidence was dismissed as a fault of the researcher, rather 
than considered for its own potential value in refuting the norm.
30
  The view that sex is 
dichotomous is so entrenched as normal science that it is hardly disputed.  When 
                                                                                                                                                 
impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.”Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders356 (4th ed. text rev. 2000). The criteria used by the 
two sources are sufficiently similar for purposes of this analysis.  
27
   WHO, supra note 26, at ch. 5, § F64.0. 
28
   Id. 
29
   Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 24-25 (The University of Chicago Press, 
2000). 
30
   Id. 
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evidence is provided that there may be some variability in the standard, it is treated as an 
abnormality.  Thus, the definition of sex may change at the margins to include outliers 
within the standard definition.              
 The relationship between the legal, political, and scientific is the foundation for 
this dissertation.  The production of sex and gender as interrelated categories is not traced 
through merely speculative philosophy, but through real legal and ethical struggles 
surrounding lived identities outside of the traditional male-female dichotomy.  The goal 
is to expose the issues related to the lived experiences of people who deal with the 
dilemma of sex and gender identity.  I explore both categorization and scientific 
advancements as a function of identity politics.  
 My dissertation examines three specific areas where I think that sex matters.  
These are areas where there is scientific concern about whether or not there are just 2 
categories of sex--male and female, and the ways in which there is a clash between our 
ethical perceptions, our political perceptions, our legal obligations, and our scientific 
understandings. 
 My first chapter looks at transsexuals and their right to get married in their 
acquired sex.  To begin with, in Western society, someone who is transsexual is someone 
who has been identified as having Gender Identity Disorder.  The primary way that you 
have a sex reassignment surgery is if you have been diagnosed with Gender Identity 
Disorder, which means that you have a persistent feeling that you exist in the wrong sex 
and that changing your sex is necessary for you to lead a healthy, well balanced life.  To 
that end, if you are diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, you are required to have 
one year of treatment.  Part of that treatment includes hormone therapy, but also 
 xvii 
psychological therapy.  At the end of that one year process, you can be given, as a cure, 
sex reassignment surgery. 
 From the scientific perspective, a person who is transsexual has acquired this sex.  
They have become female if they have transitioned from male to female.  The only real 
change that does not occur biologically with sex reassignment surgery is a change in 
chromosomes and the ability to reproduce.   
 The clashes occur when these individuals try to acquire the rights in their acquired 
sex.  There are certain areas in which being a member of a particular sex matters.  The 
area where this matters most for now in the United States is the ability to get married.  I 
explore that issue in Chapter One.  I outline how the law deals with the fact that the 
scientific community says that that person who was born male and who has had a sex 
reassignment surgery is now a female.  What do the law and our policies say in terms of 
governing how people are treated once they have transitioned?  In fact, in the United 
States, for the most part, the law says that a person is still a member of their born 
biological sex.  I trace changes in the European system.  The European Court of Human 
Rights at first did not recognize the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals, but now 
does.  I outline how the United States could import that logic.   Chapter One engages in a 
discussion of those particular issues.   
 In Chapter Two I talk about the participation of transsexuals and intersex people 
in sports.  Someone who is born intersex is born with, what the medical community calls 
sex related abnormalities.  There are a series of them.  Some of them may involve 
differences in the way genitalia looks--so the genitals might not be fully formed; may 
look feminine, but the person appears to be a male; they may look masculine and the 
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person might actually be categorized as a female at birth.  There may be a chromosomal 
abnormality.  There may be hormonal issues.  Somewhere between two and four percent 
of the population has been identified at birth as having some kind of intersex condition.  
 In sports, sex matters.  We have sex divided sports.  We have sports for men and 
sports for women.  In terms of athletic competition, there has been a long concern-- since 
about the 1930s, but more prominently in the 1960s, during the time of the rise of the 
USSR-- that there were athletes competing as women who were "faking it" or were men 
masquerading as women.   
 A set of tests was instituted to ensure that we could root these people out.  At first, 
it was simply to look at people's genitals.  A person would stand up naked, their genitalia 
would be examined, and then an official would make a determination about whether that 
person was capable of competing as a woman.  Later, people thought that process 
impinged on an athlete's privacy interests, so they instituted new policies that required for 
people to wear Spandex when they made those examinations.   
 Later, it became chromosomal tests and, eventually we have come to the regimen 
we have today.  In that regimen, we test the person for not only the Y chromosome, 
which is indicative of a person who is male, but also engage in further tests to ensure that 
this person does not suffer from some intersex condition.  Then there are a series of tests 
within that intersex condition to determine whether or not someone can participate as a 
woman in these sporting events.   
 I think examining the issue of sex in sports kind of sets the line for how difficult it 
is to determine what is female and what is male.  It is difficult from a scientific 
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perspective, not just from a legal or political perspective.  Scientists themselves struggle 
with these types of questions.   
 In particular when we look at sports, we struggle with the question of how do we 
make that body that is female, or has been assigned as female, competitive with other 
female athletes--so that the person does not have a competitive advantage?  The answer 
from the scientific perspective is, in essence, to suppress a lot of the advantages that 
someone who is intersex or a person who has made a transsexual transition would have in 
competing in those sports.  So, we give them medication to reduce their hormone levels.  
We ensure that their body fat distribution is more in line with the female norm.  We 
ensure that their musculature development is more aligned with someone who is female.   
 These decisions create a dilemma in terms of the way bodies matter, the way that 
we conceive of sex and gender and that interplay.  From my perspective that leaves two 
kinds of notes.  The first is that we are trying to bind people into dimorphic male/female 
categories and those definitions in sports are based on what it means to have an athletic 
body.  That athletic body is generally male.  So we see strength as the indicator of athletic 
prowess, which is an advantage that men have biologically via their musculature, versus 
what women may have.  We do not support sports where women may have an advantage.  
For example, sports that preference endurance.  Women have higher metabolic rates and 
better fat distribution and may be advantaged in ultra long distances.  For example, in 
ultra-marathons, women often succeed in winning races over male athletes.  
 On the other hand, I also think that it is interesting in terms of what it means in 
women's sports.  Once we start labeling people who are transsexuals or people who are 
intersex as having an advantage because they have some remnants of their male biology, 
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then we are necessarily saying that women's sports is less than men's sports.   We are 
saying that women's sports are somehow men's sports minus all these advantages.  More 
or less, we are claiming that in some ways it is a disability to be a woman, to be female.  
That is what the second chapter tracks. 
 Chapter Three discusses the way we assign sex for people who are intersex.  
When children are born intersex, doctors used to conduct a physical exam and determine, 
based on what the baby's body looked like, if that person was male or female and then 
assign the baby to that sex.  The traditional standard was based on the length of the 
clitoris.  If the clitoris was more than an inch long, it was assigned as a male.  If the 
clitoris was less than an inch long or if they had some kind of other biological 
abnormality in terms of development, they would assign that child as female.   
 That protocol was largely rooted in the work of John Money, who believed that 
gender was socially constructed, which was fairly progressive for him in the 1950s.  
Money argued that gender could in fact control sex, that it did not matter what your 
biology was, because your gender mattered more.  His theory was that you could assign 
someone to a particular sex and then normalize their gender to that sex, so they felt 
normal in society as someone who was male/masculine/man or female/feminine/woman.   
 As studies have continued, there has been greater concern about-- does that 
intersex condition necessarily mean that it is more likely that the person is going to want 
to live as a male person or as a female person?  What are the reproductive consequences 
for that person and can that person reproduce?  And, what are the mental health solutions 
in the long run?  There has been a push in recent years for people who are intersex to 
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have more flexibility in those decisions from giving parents input into a child's sex to 
giving intersex children input into their sex by delaying puberty for that decision  
 What is interesting from this intersex perspective is that, in my mind, it 
profoundly shows how the link between sex and gender are important.  We still care 
about these things.  It still matters that a sexed body is aligned with a gendered body.  We 
are always concerned that a person is acting opposite of their sex in terms of their gender 
in whatever manifestations that may be.  Often times we are willing to ignore the 
scientific or the medical reasons for engaging in surgical intervention early on in life with 
intersex children, because we want to make sure that this person's sex aligns directly with 
their gender.   I think that those consequences are significant and they illuminate how we 
perceive these issues even when we think of them as progressive.  That is why I, for 
example, included the case of Sasha-- a child who was born male and whose parents did 
not want to label it as either being male or female.  Sasha was raised until he was five not 
being assigned to a sex or gender by his parents for the general public.  But, his parents 
continuously talk about these issues in gendered terms.  His parents say, "We do not want 
Sasha to wear super masculine stuff.  We do not want Sasha to have a Barbie.  We want 
to make Sasha wear a girl's blouse to school, because we want Sasha to be androgynous."  
In that sense of androgyny, what they are really doing is pushing against what his desires 
may be.  His desires may not be to wear a blouse.  His desires obviously are to 
occasionally wear hypermasculine clothes or to play with a Barbie.  They are denying 
him those interests.  In doing so, in essence, I think his parents are acknowledging that 
gender and sex matter.  They matter in an incredibly important way even for a child that 
they are trying to raise androgynously. 
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 From my perspective in terms of intersex children there is a balance between 
wanting to do or needing to do what is medically necessary as early in the process as 
possible and acknowledging that the child can have some gender flexibility as that child 
moves forward.  
 Chapter Four is about sex selection.  It traces this process of sex selection from 
prehistory to today.  It outlines the process of aborting children or selecting the sex of a 
child before a child is implanted or born.  I think this is related because it gives us a sense 
of what our preferences are as a society in terms of the children we want to produce.  
Why is it that for thousands of years, since before recorded history, there has been some 
level of preference for having male children in most societies?  There are a number of 
gender reasons that we have those preferences-- whether that be that female children have 
to pay a dowry, that male children inherit the name and the money from the family, or 
that male children are perceived to provide financial benefits, or whether it is just a stated 
preference for having a daughter who is girly or frilly versus a boy who is tough and 
plays with trucks. 
 The approach from an ethical perspective about these particular questions has 
always been-- how do we restrict these practices and what are the justifications for 
restricting these practices?  In particular, limiting sex selection has been problematic 
because there are a number of sex linked disorders that could be reasons why people 
would want to select, generally, a female child to prevent such a disorder.  All of these 
approaches have come from the perspective of how we regulate this practice.  I think that 
that perspective is somewhat turned around. 
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 I think that the more important question is: Why do people care?  Why do we 
want to select our children's sex?  How do we intervene to resolve that problem?  I think 
that is not only the more interesting problem, but the more important issue.  I think the 
answer on that end is to eradicate issues of sex inequality, so that that preference is no 
longer articulated.  The reason why parents care about the sex of their children is because 
of sex inequity.  That is the manifest reason why we believe that those things are 
important.   
 The other end of that is to permit gender flexibility.  The more flexible people's 
gender roles are-- how they act in society-- the less importance sex holds.  If we have 
female children who are born and we believe that they can become professional athletes 
or they can become the President of the United States, and that they can act in 
traditionally masculine ways, if they can inherit property, if they do not have to pay 
dowries-- if those roles are eliminated, then the relevance of the sex and gender become 
less important.   
 These are fairly complicated issues.  Examining these issues in terms of the lived 
realities of individuals, in terms of issues that are occurring now rather than speculating 
about issues that might occur, talking about the problems in terms of defining sex and 
gender from all three of these perspectives--from the legal, the political, and the 
scientific-- illustrates that this is a problem area.  The solution, from my perspective, is to 
continue to press for increased legal and political equality for the sexes and for more 
flexibility in terms of individuals' gender. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
THE (MIS)CATEGORIZATION OF SEX IN ANGLO-AMERICAN CASES OF 
TRANSSEXUAL MARRIAGE 
 A legal dilemma occurs when post-operative transsexuals attempt to gain legal 
recognition of their acquired sex.  Given the widespread belief that sex is easily 
categorized and fixed at birth, attaining legal recognition of an acquired sex can be 
difficult.
31
  Particularly contentious is the recognition of sex in legal agreements in which 
the parties’ sex is legally relevant.  Of these legal agreements, marriage is the most 
salient and controversial, as it is often limited by law to a partnership between two people 
of opposite sex.
32
 
 Currently, states lack uniformity in whether and how they recognize the acquired 
sex of post-operative transsexuals in both birth certificates and for the purpose of 
marriage, resulting in sex being determined largely by a person’s state of residency. 
 When states fail to recognize transsexuals’ acquired sex, individuals’ rights are 
limited.  As I will argue in this Chapter, these limitations constitute a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
33
  Throughout the United Kingdom,
34
 in contrast, the law 
                                                 
31
   Typically legal recognition comes in the form of official documents such as birth certificates, 
insurance, marriage documents, etc.  
32
   E.g., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified as amended at 1 
U.S.C. § 7 & 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996)).  
33
   See infra Section 3. 
34
   This Chapter will examine both the case law in the United Kingdom and the European Court of 
Human Rights. The European Court of Human Rights is a constitutional court established by the European 
Convention of Human Rights to monitor human rights in member states through application of the 
Convention. The United Kingdom is the primary focus of this Chapter for two reasons. First, the European 
Court of Human Rights case law on transsexuals’ rights to gain recognition in their acquired sex deals with 
cases from the United Kingdom. Decisions made by the European Court of Human Rights interpret and 
apply either the European Convention on Human Rights, which binds all member states, or the law of 
member states directly. Accordingly, its decisions are binding on member states. The decisions made by the 
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recognizes the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals for nearly all purposes, 
including for birth certificates and marriage.  In this Chapter I will explore the legal 
hurdles faced in determining the sex of a post-operative transsexual for the purpose of 
marriage in the Anglo-American legal system.  Examining the differences between the 
laws in the United States and the United Kingdom clarifies both the problem of sex 
categorization and the arguable legal denial of many transsexuals’ substantive due 
process and equal protection rights.  
 I will establish that the United Kingdom’s approach, as detailed both in decisions 
of courts in the United Kingdom and the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), is 
consistent with U.S. Constitutional requirements and provides a reasoning that the United 
States should borrow in its own consideration of these issues.  In Part I, I demonstrate the 
inconsistent approach to recognizing the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals for 
the purpose of marriage in the United States.  I will analyze the systematic change in 
legal reasoning in the United Kingdom that eventually led to the recognition of a post-
operative transsexual’s sex for the purpose of marriage in Part II.  In Part III I argue that 
the sex equality model underpinning the change in the United Kingdom should be 
imported into the United States to resolve the state court split in favor of recognizing the 
acquired sex of a post-operative transsexual. Additionally, in Part III I will provide a 
legal framework for making this change in the United States.  
                                                                                                                                                 
European Court of Human Rights with regard to the status of transsexuals in the United Kingdom are thus 
binding on the United Kingdom, adding to their case law, as these decisions both interpret the Convention, 
to which the United Kingdom is bound, and the law of the United Kingdom directly. Moreover, the United 
Kingdom, like the United States, is a common law nation. Given the historical links between the United 
Kingdom and the United States in terms of common law, the United Kingdom is the most relevant nation 
for comparison.  
 3 
SECTION 1. 
States in the United States Are Divided on Recognition of Acquired Sex 
 In the United States, the recognition of a transsexual’s acquired sex is currently an 
issue addressed solely by state law.  A birth certificate is the legal record of a person’s 
sex.
35
  Therefore, a transsexual must have the sex on his/her birth certificate changed in 
order to attain legal recognition of an acquired sex.  Transsexuals must modify their birth 
certificates before updating their acquired sex on other legal documents.  States have 
various approaches to recognizing a person’s acquired sex.  In this Section I outline the 
various approaches taken by states regarding recognition and presents background to 
furnish the argument developed in Sections 2 and 3.  Within Subsection A I examine the 
right to change a birth certificate to reflect a sex change and demonstrate that state 
practices vary dramatically.  In Subsection B I discuss variations among states’ laws 
regarding the right to marry as a member of an acquired sex.  
A. Changing the Sex Listed on Birth Certificates 
 The policies of changing the sex listed on a birth certificate fit into three general 
approaches.  First, there are states with a permissive statutory or administrative approach.   
There are also states that do not allow changes to the sex listed on a birth certificate.   
Finally, there are states that do not yet have a set administrative or statutory system for 
addressing changes to the sex listed on a birth certificate.  
                                                 
35 
Birth certificates are the primary document used for the assignment of other legal documents, 
including driver’s licenses, passports, etc. Thus, the sex listed on a birth certificate may be determinative of 
the sex listed on other legal documents.  
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1. States with a Permissive Statutory or Administrative System 
 Twenty-eight states have a permissive statutory or administrative policy that 
provides a mechanism for changing the sex on a birth certificate.  Currently, twenty-four 
states and the District of Columbia statutorily permit changing a birth certificate to 
recognize a transsexual’s acquired sex.36  These states also allow modification of other 
official state documents.
37
  But most of these states require proof of a sex change 
operation before permitting the alteration of other legal documents.
38
 
 Four other states—Kansas, Maine, Nevada, and New York—have no statutes 
regarding transsexuals’ right to legally change their acquired sex on their birth 
certificates.
39
  Instead, these four states provide an administrative process for the 
modification of birth certificates,
40
 which requires demonstrating a need to change the birth 
certificate.
41
  A post-operative transsexual would likely be able to attain a birth certificate 
change to recognize the acquired sex by using this process.
42
  The problem is that there is 
no set standard for what “need” entails.  For instance, in Kansas the Department of Health 
and Environment requires medical certification of a sex change operation,
43
 whereas in 
New York, a court order, made at the judge’s discretion and based on surgical 
                                                 
36      
Julie A. Greenberg & Marybeth Herald, You Can’t Take It With You: Constitutional Consequences 
of Interstate Gender-Identity Rulings, 80 Wash. L. Rev. 819, 837 (2005). 
37
     Id. 
38
     E.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 144.23(3) (West 2009). 
39 
See Lambda Legal, Amending Birth Certificates to Reflect Your Correct Sex, 
http://lambdalegal.com (search for "Amended Birth Certificates” and then click “view the law in your 
state”) (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
40 
See Id. 
41
    See Id. 
42
    See Id. 
43
    Kansas Department of Health and Environment, How to Amend Birth Certificates for Adults, 
http://www.kdheks.gov/vital/amend_birth_adults.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). The Department also 
notes, “Taking hormones or breast reassignment surgery does not qualify as a sex or gender change.” Id. 
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documentation, is required.
44
  Thus, despite statutory or administrative mechanisms for 
recognizing a change in birth certificates, some changes are not approved.
45
 
2. States with Prohibitive Statutory Systems 
 Two states, Texas and Tennessee, expressly prohibit changing sex on birth 
certificates.  Texas courts have ruled that administrative changes to the sex listed on a 
birth certificate can only be made if the birth certificate contains an inaccuracy.
46
  Texas 
has specifically stated that a sex change operation does not constitute an inaccuracy for 
the purpose of modifying a birth certificate.
47
  Tennessee has specific legislation 
forbidding the modification of a birth certificate to reflect the acquired sex of a post-
operative transsexual.
48
 
3. States with Neither a Statutory nor Administrative Mechanism 
 The remaining twenty states have no specific statutory or administrative 
mechanism for allowing post-operative transsexuals to change the sex listed on a birth 
certificate.  In such jurisdictions, the only way to modify a birth certificate is within the 
courts.
49
  Case law demonstrates a divergence of states’ recognition of post-operative 
transsexuals’ acquired sex.50  Legal sex is particularly important relative to the right of 
                                                 
44
   Becky Alison, Transgender Roadmap, http://www.tsroadmap.com/reality/name/new-york-birth-
certificate.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010). 
45
   See Press Release, Lamda Legal, Refusals To Change Transgendered People’s Birth Certificates 
Almost Always Conflict with State Laws (Nov. 12, 2002), http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/birth-
certificate-amend-male-female.html. 
46
   Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999). 
47
   Id. (interpreting the Texas statute and codifying that sex reassignment surgery is not a mistake). 
48     
Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-3-203(d) (2009) (“The sex of an individual shall not be changed on the 
original certificate of birth as a result of sex change surgery.”). 
49     
Greenberg & Herald, supra note 36, at 838.  
50     
See infra Section I.B.  
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marriage in the United States, because most states do not currently recognize same-sex 
marriage.
51
 
B. Recognizing a Change in Sex for the Purpose of Marriage 
 States’ marriage laws also vary in their treatment of changes in sex.  Issues 
relating to marriage validity in which one of the parties is a post-operative transsexual 
have been litigated in several state courts in the past decade.  In California,
52
 trial courts 
have held that post-operative transsexuals can legally be recognized as a member of the 
acquired sex.  During the same period, the Supreme Court of Kansas
53
and the Courts of 
Appeals of Florida,
54
 Texas,
55
 and Ohio
56
 all ruled that for purposes of marriage, 
transsexuals are recognized only as members of their born sex, and not their acquired sex.  
Further investigation of the legal decisions in the United States will highlight two 
divergent views on the right of transsexuals to marry as members of their acquired sex.  
Section 1.B.1 establishes that most jurisdictions do not recognize the acquired sex of 
post-operative transsexuals.  Section 1.B.2 discusses the reasoning expressed by 
jurisdictions that recognize an acquired sex for the purpose of marriage, demonstrating a 
lack of comprehensive analysis behind the underlying goals of such a policy. 
                                                 
51     
If a state recognizes same-sex marriage, the need to change the sex on a birth certificate is less 
consequential because the sex of your spouse would not preclude you from getting married. Of course, 
there are other reasons a transsexual may want to change the sex listed on his/her birth certificate.  
52     
See, e.g., Transgender Ruling, L.A. Daily J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1. 
53
   In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002). 
54     
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
55     
Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 224 (Tex. App. 1999). 
56     
In re Marriage License for Nash, Nos. 2002-T-0149, 2002-T-0179, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Dec. 31, 2003). 
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1. Most Jurisdictions Do Not Recognize the Acquired Sex of Post-Operative 
Transsexuals 
 In the Texas case Littleton v. Prange, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual 
petitioned for the right to sue for malpractice and the wrongful death of her husband.
57
 
The defendant, Dr. Mark Prange, petitioned the court, successfully arguing that the 
plaintiff, Christie Lee Littleton, could not bring a claim for wrongful death because she 
was a man and her marriage was therefore invalid.  Littleton appealed the decision to the 
Court of Appeals of Texas.
58
  Chief Justice Hardberger, writing for the majority, 
explained that, although Littleton physically looked like a woman, she was not legally a 
woman because she did not possess a womb, ovaries, or a cervix and because she 
retained male chromosomes.
59
  The majority concluded Christie was a man who could 
not be legally married to another man.
60
  The Court thereby affirmed the lower court 
ruling, indicating that sexual identity is not determined by sexual organs, but instead by 
chromosomes.
61
  The court thus invalidated Littleton’s marriage, precluding her from 
suing on her husband’s behalf.62 
 The court of appeals judges in Littleton were unwilling to rely primarily on 
scientific literature regarding post-operative transsexuals in reaching their holding.
63
  The 
court did acknowledge, however, that sex determination involves profound philosophical, 
                                                 
57     
Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225. 
58      
Id. 
59     
Id. at 230–31. 
60     
Id.  
61     
Id. 
62     
Id. 
63
   Id. 
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metaphysical, and policy concerns.
64
  But instead of consistently focusing on the biology 
of sex and the rights stemming from it, the court employed an analysis of the moral and 
religious aspects of the issue as proxies for biology (although the court did not rest its 
holding on this reasoning).
65
  Sidestepping strictly legal concerns, the court asked, “[C]an 
a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel, drugs and counseling, or is a 
person’s gender immutably fixed by our Creator at birth?”66 
 Regardless of the court’s acknowledgement of these issues, the ultimate focus in 
Littleton was on a chromosomal standard and, to a lesser extent, functioning biology to 
categorize a sex ambiguity into a dimorphic position.  Chief Justice Hardberger 
explained, “Some physicians would consider Christie a female; other physicians would 
consider her still a male.  Her female anatomy, however, is all man-made.  The body that 
Christie inhabits is a male body in all aspects other than what the physicians have 
supplied.”67  Hardberger noted, “The male chromosomes do not change with either 
hormonal treatment or sex reassignment surgery.  Biologically a post-operative female 
transsexual is still a male.”68  The court did not recognize Littleton’s sex in spite of the 
fact that the decision to undergo a sex change operation was medically advised and the 
change in her sex was recognized by the medical community.
69
 
 The Littleton reasoning represents the prevailing view of jurisdictions that do not 
recognize the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals.  In Estate of Gardiner, the 
                                                 
64
   Id. at 231. 
65     
See Id. at 224. 
66     
Id. 
67     
Id. at 231. 
68     
Id. at 230. 
69      
Id. at 224–25. 
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Kansas Supreme Court, citing Littleton, concluded, “A male-to-female post-operative 
transsexual does not fit the definition of a female.  The male organs have been removed, 
but the ability to ‘produce ova and bear offspring’ does not and never did exist.  There is 
no womb, cervix, or ovaries, nor is there any change in his chromosomes.”70  Similarly, 
in Kantaras v. Kantaras the Florida Court of Appeals held, “We agree with the Kansas, 
Ohio, and Texas courts in their understanding of the common meaning of male and 
female, as those terms are used statutorily, to refer to immutable traits determined at 
birth.”71 
 The message of the Littleton court is that, even though a sex change operation is 
medically prescribed and the person physically changed, a person’s acquired sex will not 
be legally recognized in some states.  The end result is that, in these states, transsexuals 
can never fully attain recognition of their sex.  These cases reveal that, ultimately, the 
question of legal rights was of lesser concern than the recognition of a biological or a 
moral standard.  
2. The Reasoning Supporting the Recognition of the Acquired Sex of  
Post-Operative Transsexuals 
 The primary model for recognizing an individual’s acquired sex is statutory or 
administrative, so few cases illustrate the underlying rationale for accepting an 
individual’s acquired sex.  The earliest of these cases in the United States, M.T. v. J.T., 
recognized the legal right of transsexuals to marry in their acquired sex.
72
  The case 
                                                 
70
   42 P.3d 120,135 (Kan. 2002). 
71     
884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004). 
72     
355 A.2d 204, 205 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). 
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began when M.T. filed a claim with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in New 
Jersey for support and maintenance.
73
  In defense of not paying support and maintenance, 
J.T, a man, claimed that the marriage between J.T. and M.T., a male-to-female 
transsexual, was invalid because M.T. was male and not female.
74
  J.T. first met M.T. in 
1964, seven years before M.T. had a sex change operation.
75
  When J.T. and M.T. first 
met, M.T. was living as a woman, but J.T. was aware that M.T. was biologically born 
male.
76
  In 1971, M.T. had a sex change operation.
77
  In 1972, J.T. and M.T. had a 
marriage ceremony, consummated their relationship, and lived together for two years.
78
 
 The court focused on the psychological aspects of sex as a key component in 
determining a transsexual’s sex for the purpose of marriage.  The court reasoned that 
mere biology was not significant in determining sex.  “A person’s sex or sexuality 
embraces an individual’s gender, that is, one’s self-image, the deep psychological or 
emotional sense of sexual identity and character.”79  The court concluded that “for marital 
purposes if the anatomical or genital features of a genuine transsexual are made to 
conform to the person’s gender, psyche or psychological sex, then identity by sex must be 
governed by the congruence of these standards.”80  The decision placed greater focus on 
the individual’s identity, and the alignment of sex and gender to meet that perception, as 
the proper measure for determining a person’s sex.  
                                                 
73
   M.T., 355 A.2d at 205. 
74     
Id. 
75     
Id. 
76     
Id. 
77     
Id. 
78     
Id. 
79     
Id. at 209. 
80     
Id. 
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 Although M.T. v. J.T. was a significant step towards transsexuals’ ability to gain 
recognition of an acquired sex, the case contained some significant caveats.  The primary 
limitation of the decision was that the court explicitly held that the ability to have full 
intercourse determines the validity of a marriage.  Specifically, the court stated, “Sexual 
capacity or sexuality in this frame of reference requires the coalescence of both the 
physical ability and the psychological and emotional orientation to engage in sexual 
intercourse as either a male or a female.”81  Thus, the court limited the recognition of a 
post-operative transsexual by the capacity to consummate a relationship: A person having 
a sex change operation that did not result in the ability to have traditional heterosexual 
penetrative intercourse would not have his or her sex recognized for the purposes of 
marriage.  In particular, the court noted, “[A] female transsexual [who] had had a 
hysterectomy and mastectomy but had not received any male organs and was incapable 
of performing sexually as a male” would be ineligible for recognition in the acquired sex 
for the purpose of marriage.
82
 
 There have been no significant cases recognizing the acquired sex of a post-
operative transsexual for the purpose of marriage since M.T. v. J.T.
83
  Cases in other 
jurisdictions have recognized the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals, utilizing a 
slightly different rationale.  For example, in Richards v. United States Tennis Ass’n, 
Renee Richards, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual, petitioned the state of New 
                                                 
81
   Id. 
82     
Id. 
83    
One known case in California, Vecchione v. Vecchione, concurred with the court in M.T. v. J.T., but 
because there was no appeal there is no reported decision. Vecchione v. Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769 
(Cal. Super. Ct. 1997); see Transgender Ruling, supra note 52, at 1. 
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York for the right to compete as a woman in the U.S. Open.
84
  Richards had previously 
participated as a man in the competition before undergoing sex reassignment surgery.
85
  
The United States Tennis Association rejected her application on the theory that she was 
unfairly advantaged because her previous status as a man made her physically stronger.
86
  
Specifically, the United States Tennis Association argued that the Barr body test 
indicated Richards had a Y chromosome and that the very expression of the Y 
chromosome gave her an improper and unfair physical advantage.
87
  The New York State 
Supreme Court rejected the application of the Barr body test for chromosomes because 
hormone therapy had effectively repressed the impact of the Y chromosome,
88
 and 
Richards was granted the right to compete as a woman in the U.S. Open.  
 Richards and M.T. v. J.T. focused on biology in determining the right to be 
recognized in an acquired sex.  Both cases were guided by the same principle (although 
they focused on different aspects of biology), and therefore both indicate a willingness to 
legally recognize sex changes.  The court in Richards considered the modification of 
Richards’s chromosomal impact, as a result of operation, sufficient to recognize a change 
in sex.  The focus was not on the right to change her sex, but on the biology of the change 
and its recognition. 
 
                                                 
84      
Elizabeth Fee, et al. One Size Does Not Fit All in the Transgender Community, 93 Am. J. Pub. 
Health.899 (2003). 
85     
Id. 
86 
   Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 270 (Sup. Ct. 1977). 
87     
Id. at 268–69. 
88     
Id. at 272–73. 
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SECTION 2. 
The United Kingdom and the ECHR Model: Recognizing Transsexuals’ Legal 
Rights in Their Acquired Sex 
 During the last four decades, the United Kingdom has significantly expanded 
transsexuals’ legal right to marry in their acquired sex.  Forty years ago the United 
Kingdom did not allow post-operative transsexuals the right to seek a change in the sex 
listed on a birth certificate and actually invalidated marriages of transsexuals in their 
acquired sex.  Critical rulings by the ECHR, however, changed the legal rights of 
transsexuals.  An examination of the case law reveals how the legal doctrine was 
reshaped and ultimately came to recognize the acquired sex of post-operative 
transsexuals.  In Subsection A I discuss the United Kingdom’s initial position that post-
operative transsexuals could not marry as members of their acquired sex.  In Subsection 
B I examine the shift in legal decisions by the ECHR that led to the eventual recognition 
of the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals for the purpose of marriage in the 
United Kingdom.  
A. The United Kingdom’s Initial Position: Post-Operative Transsexuals Did Not  
Have the Right to Marry As Members of Their Acquired Sex 
 The United Kingdom initially took the legal position that a post-operative 
transsexual could not marry a person with a sex matching the transsexual’s birth sex.89 
Forty years ago, in the landmark case Corbett v. Corbett, the United Kingdom established 
                                                 
89     
Corbett v. Corbett, [1970] 2 All E.R. 33, 88 (P.). 
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sex as fixed at birth.
90
  The court held that “the biological sexual constitution of an 
individual is fixed at birth (at the latest), and cannot be changed, either by the natural 
development of organs of the opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means.”91  The court 
arrived at this conclusion by examining the testimony of various medical practitioners 
who all argued that sex is determined at birth.
92
  Specifically, the court focused on 
determinations by the experts that an individual’s sex is determined by four factors: (1) 
chromosomal, (2) gonadal, (3) genital, and (4) psychological.
93
  The court concluded that 
the psychological factor was not relevant in determining sex, disregarding the experts’ 
opinion,
94
 and proceeded to hold that “the law should adopt . . . the chromosomal, 
gonadal and genital tests, and if all three are congruent, determine the sex for the purpose 
of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative intervention.”95  The court 
acknowledged that there may not be full congruence on the three factors, writing that 
“[t]he real difficulties, of course, will occur if these three criteria are not congruent.”96   
Judge Omrod, writing for the court, indicated in dictum that “greater weight would 
probably be given to the genital criteria than to the other two.”97  The only specific 
recognition of a sex change acknowledged by the court was when “a mistake as to sex is 
made at birth and subsequently revealed by further medical investigation.”98  The Corbett 
marriage was invalidated, in part under the view that a marriage cannot be consummated 
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   Id. at 104. 
91     
Id. 
92     
Id. 
93     
Id. at 100. 
94     
Id. at 106. 
95     
Id. 
96     
Id. 
97     
Id. 
98     
Id. at 84. 
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unless there is full penetration, which is only possible when the female is born with a 
vagina.
99
 
 The United Kingdom’s legal position on transsexuals was further solidified by the 
ECHR in Rees v. United Kingdom.
100
  From birth, Brenda Margaret Rees possessed “the 
physical and biological characteristics of a child of the female sex” and was designated a 
female in the register of births.
101
  “However, already from a tender age the child started 
to exhibit masculine behavior and was ambiguous in appearance.”102  Rees began 
hormone treatment, had a double mastectomy, and changed her name to Brendan Mark 
Rees.
103
  Rees eventually had all legal documents, with the exception of his birth 
certificate, reflect his sex change.
104
  Rees brought a case to have his birth certificate 
changed and to attain the right to marry as a member of his acquired sex.  A medical 
expert testified that: 
[O]f the four criteria of sex—namely chromosomal sex, gonadal sex, apparent sex 
(external genitalia and body form) and psychological sex, the last was the most 
important as it determined the individual’s social activities and role in adult life, 
and it was also, in his view, pre-determined at birth, though not evident until later 
in life.”105 
The expert concluded “the applicant’s psychological sex was male, [so] he should be 
assigned male.”106 
                                                 
99
   Id. at 105 (acknowledging that there may be some difficulty in this determination if a person suffers 
from a congenital defect that makes full penetration impossible and indicating that under such 
circumstances an operation may enlarge the vagina or an argument may be made for incapacity). 
100
   App. No. 9532/81, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. 56 (1987). 
101
   Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 12.  
102     
Id. 
103     
Id.paras. 13–14. 
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Id.para. 17. 
105     
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 Rees contended that the United Kingdom’s refusal to recognize his acquired sex 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights under both Article 8
107
 (the right to 
respect of private life) and Article 12
108
 (the right to marry and form a family).
109
  The 
court rejected the Article 8 claim, reasoning that the government had a significant interest 
in not altering birth certificates or providing alternative sex documentation.  The ECHR 
found that the United Kingdom might have “positive obligations inherent in an effective 
respect for private life,” but that the governmental interest outweighed private individual 
interests.
110
  The ECHR went on to hold that there was no Article 12 violation because 
“the right to marry guaranteed by Article 12 refers to the traditional marriage between 
persons of opposite biological sex,” and the primary focus is on the formation of 
family.
111
  The holding clarified that Article 12 ensures only that “the very essence of the 
right” is not impaired and that, as long as people of the opposite biological sex are 
allowed to marry, the law in the United Kingdom is permissible.
112
  Yet the ECHR noted, 
“The need for appropriate legal measures [for transsexuals] should therefore be kept 
under review having regard particularly to scientific and societal developments.”113 
                                                 
107     
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1950, 
213 U.N.T.S. 221 (“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence.”). 
108     
Id. at art. 12 (“Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, 
according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.”). 
109     
Rees, 9 Eur. H.R. Rep. para. 31. The United Kingdom is bound by the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
110    
Id. para. 35. 
111     
Id. para. 49. The ECHR is making two assumptions with this holding: first, that the goal of 
marriage is reproduction and the formation of a family, and second, that transsexual couples are incapable 
of forming a family.  
112     
Id. para. 50.  
113     
Id. para. 47. 
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 Three years later, the ECHR reviewed Rees in Cossey v. United Kingdom.
114
 
Cossey concerned Caroline Cossey, a post-operative transsexual who was born male.  
Beginning at age 13, Cossey began feeling differently from other males, later feeling 
psychologically female, and eventually pursuing hormone treatment and sexual 
reassignment surgery to make her physically female.
115
  Caroline Cossey married in 
1989;
116
 but, in 1990, the English High Court “pronounced [the marriage] to have been 
by law void by reason of the parties not being respectively male and female.”117 
 Cossey, like Rees, argued the United Kingdom violated Articles 8 and 12 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights.  While Cossey attempted to distinguish herself 
from Rees, because Mr. Rees did not yet have a partner wishing to marry him,
118
 the 
ECHR found this distinction immaterial.
119
  And, although the ECHR reviewed the case, 
they concluded they had “been informed of no significant scientific developments that 
have occurred in the meantime; in particular, it remains the case—as was not contested 
by the applicant—that gender reassignment surgery does not result in the acquisition of 
all the biological characteristics of the other sex.”120  In the end, the ECHR refused to 
depart from the holding in Rees, stating “that attachment to the traditional concept of 
marriage provides sufficient reason for the continued adoption of biological criteria for 
determining a person’s sex for the purpose of marriage.”121 
                                                 
114     
Cossey v. United Kingdom, App. No. 10843/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 622 ara. 1 (1990). 
115     
Id. paras. 10–11. 
116     
Id. para. 14. 
117     
Id. 
118     
Id. para. 44.  
119     
Id. 
120     
Id. para. 40.  
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 Seven years later, the ECHR examined not the right to marry, but the right for a 
female-to-male transsexual to be named as the father of a child on the child’s birth 
certificate with X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom.
122
  The ECHR relied heavily on the 
conceptions of sex solidified in Corbett, Rees, and Cossey to hold that the European 
Convention on Human Rights does not grant an individual right to the recognition of a 
sex change that is medically required.  In the end, the ECHR acknowledged that 
transsexual identity “raises complex scientific, legal, moral and social issues,” but refused 
recognition of the acquired sex.
123
 
 In Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, the ECHR continued to apply the 
biological standards in Corbett, Rees, and Cossey in determining that transsexuals had no 
right to recognition of an acquired sex for purposes of marriage or modification of a birth 
certificate.
124
  Simultaneously, however, the ECHR acknowledged a need for the United 
Kingdom to alter laws concerning transsexuals.
125
  Though the court maintained that “the 
applicants have not shown that since the date of adoption of its Cossey judgment in 1990 
that there have been any findings in the area of medical science which settle conclusively 
the doubts concerning the causes of the condition of transsexualism,”126 it acknowledged 
that a change in this policy could occur.  
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X, Y, & Z v. United Kingdom, App. No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143paras. 12–17 (1997). 
123
   Id. para. 3.  
124     
Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 22885/93, 23390/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163 
paras. 36–37 (1998). 
125     
As in the previous cases, in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom “the issue [raised by the 
applicants] before the court is not that the respondent State should abstain from acting to their detriment but 
that it has failed to take positive steps to modify a system which [they] claim operates to their detriment.” 
Id. para. 51.  
126     
Id. para. 56. 
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 The Court reasoned that the status of transsexuals could change if scientific 
research indicated a conclusive position on the sex of transsexuals.  Moreover, the ECHR 
reminded the United Kingdom that “there is an increased social acceptance of 
transsexualism and an increased recognition of the problems which post-operative 
transsexuals encounter. Even if it finds no breach of Article 8 in this case, the Court 
reiterates that this area needs to be kept under review by Contracting States.”127  The 
ECHR acknowledged that, in addition to potential scientific codification resulting in the 
acknowledgement of the right for transsexuals to be recognized in their acquired sex, the 
increased social acceptance warranted review of the sex status of post-operative 
transsexuals.
128
 
B. The United Kingdom’s Policy Now Recognizes the Acquired Sex of Transsexuals 
 for the Purposes of Marriage 
 The grounds for further reflection and alteration in policy were set in Sheffield & 
Horsham v. United Kingdom, but it would take another four years for the policy in the 
United Kingdom to change.  Two pivotal cases, Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I v. 
United Kingdom, brought jointly before the ECHR and referred to as Goodwin v. United 
Kingdom, altered the legal status of post-operative transsexuals in the United 
Kingdom.
129
  Ultimately, these cases led to the recognition of the acquired sex of 
transsexuals for the purposes of marriage.  
                                                 
127     
Id. para. 60. 
128     
In addition, nine of the twenty justices dissented from the opinion in Sheffield & Horsham v. 
United Kingdom on Article 8 grounds. Id. para. 80. 
129     
App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447 (2002). 
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 In 2002, the ECHR reversed its precedent regarding the status of post-operative 
transsexuals in Goodwin v. United Kingdom.  The ECHR noted that the United Kingdom 
was already reexamining the basis of its treatment of transsexuals.
130
  On April 14, 1999, 
“the Secretary of State for the Home Department announced the establishment of an 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People.”131  In 2000, the 
Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People concluded that “the principal 
areas where the transsexual community is seeking change are birth certificates, the right 
to marry and full recognition of their new gender for all legal purposes.”132  The ECHR 
concluded that the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People and its 
findings constituted an acknowledgement of the changing societal status of transsexuals 
in the United Kingdom and Europe more generally.
133
 
 In accepting the right of transsexuals to legal recognition of their acquired sex, the 
court acknowledged sex discrimination against transsexuals.  The court noted that the 
lack of legal recognition of the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals had the 
greatest “effects on the applicant’s life where sex is of legal relevance and distinctions are 
made between men and women.”134 
 The ECHR also recognized a violation of the right to privacy, indicating “that 
serious interference with private life can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts 
with an important aspect of personal identity.”135  In effect, the court asserted that there is 
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Goodwin, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447. 
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132     
Id.para. 50 (citation omitted). 
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“discordance between the position in society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and 
the status imposed by law which refuses to recognize the change of [sex].”136 
Transsexuals are denied the right by courts to live their lives as they see fit because of 
rules that deny a concordance between their personal identity and their legal status.
137
 
 The ECHR also noted a peculiar disparity between the medical diagnosis that 
eventually motivated the decision to undergo a sex change operation and the legal status 
of transsexuals.
138
  A sex reassignment surgery is a procedure recommended for some 
people who suffer from gender identity disorder,
139
 the belief that one’s sex and gender 
are not properly aligned.
140
  The goal of sex reassignment surgery is “as close an 
assimilation as possible to the gender in which the transsexual perceives that he or she 
properly belongs.”141  In fact, the National Health Service in the United Kingdom 
recognizes gender identity disorder and sex reassignment surgery.
142
  “Where a State has 
authorized the treatment and surgery alleviating the condition of a transsexual, financed 
or assisted in financing the operations . . . it appears illogical to refuse to recognize the 
legal implications of the result to which the treatment leads.”143 
 The ECHR continued by concluding that scientific evidence points to a distinct 
biological and psychological recognition of transsexuals as members of their acquired 
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In the United Kingdom, gender identity disorder is often referred to as gender dysphoria. For 
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sex.
144
  The Court also concluded that “the principal unchanging biological aspect of 
[sex] is the chromosomal element.”145  It went on to acknowledge that there may be 
natural chromosomal abnormalities that still require a person to be designated as a 
member of one sex or the other, despite that person not fitting into the traditional 
distinction between male (XY) and female (XX).
146
  Thus, the lack of recognition of the 
acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals was not congruent with provisions of Article 
8. 
  Regarding the right to marry specifically, the ECHR overruled Rees
147
 and 
Cossey.
148
  The ECHR held “that it is artificial to assert that post-operative transsexuals 
have not been deprived of the right to marry as, according to law, they remain able to marry 
a person of their former opposite sex.”149  The ECHR found its previous position 
incommensurate with the desire for a post-operative transsexual to marry someone opposite 
of his or her acquired sex.  The ECHR noted that Goodwin lived as a female and “is in a 
relationship with a man and would only wish to marry a man.  She has no possibility of 
doing so.  In the Court’s view, she may therefore claim that the very essence of her right to 
marry has been infringed.”150 
 Ultimately, the ECHR held that the United Kingdom must take steps “to 
implement such measures as it considers appropriate to fulfill its obligations to secure the 
applicant’s, and other transsexuals’, right to respect for private life and right to marry in 
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compliance with this judgment.”151  The end result was the establishment of the Gender 
Recognition Act in 2004, which provided full recognition of the sex of both post- and 
pre-operative adult transsexuals.
152
 
 
SECTION 3. 
 Applying a Sex Equality Model Emerging From the United Kingdom and the 
ECHR as a Method for Resolving the Divided State Positions in the United States 
 The lack of a coherent position within the United States places transsexuals in a 
position where recognition of their sex is entirely dependent upon their state of residence. 
The result is that fundamental liberties stemming from recognition of an acquired sex are 
arbitrarily governed by residency.  Therefore, a post-operative transsexual wishing to 
challenge a state’s refusal to change the sex on his/her birth certificate should utilize a 
Fourteenth Amendment claim by arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should borrow the 
legal reasoning the ECHR applied to the United Kingdom.
153
  Subsection A explains the 
concept of reason-borrowing, discusses when and why it is invoked, and argues that the 
ECHR is an appropriate source from which U.S. courts should reason-borrow.  This 
Section will continue by examining specific reasoning that should be imported from the 
ECHR to support recognition under the U.S. Constitution of the right of transsexuals to 
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See supra note 34 for a discussion of the connection between laws in the UK and the ECHR and 
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be recognized in their acquired sex for marriage purposes.
154
  In particular, Subsection B 
will propose borrowing ECHR’s reasoning on privacy and liberty.  Subsection C 
examines potential reason-borrowing from the ECHR on sex discrimination.  Finally, 
Subsection D explains how the Supreme Court can borrow ECHR reasoning on emergent 
post-operative transsexual treatment. 
A. Precedent for Reason-Borrowing 
 The reason-borrowing framework provides support for protecting transsexuals’ 
right to marry in their acquired sex.
155
  Reason-borrowing would import the reasons given 
by a foreign or international decision maker for arriving at a particular position into 
United States jurisprudence.
156
 
 Reason-borrowing has been strongly advocated for by Supreme Court Justices 
when similar issues were raised in similarly situated foreign courts. Justice Breyer noted, 
“[W]e find an increasing number of issues, including constitutional issues, where the 
decisions of foreign courts help by offering points of comparison. . . . Judges in different 
countries increasingly apply somewhat similar legal phrases to somewhat similar 
circumstances . . . .”157  In other words, Justice Breyer is suggesting that the Supreme 
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Court use foreign courts as sources of legal reasoning upon which to support opinions in 
United States courts when the U.S. court and foreign court are addressing similar issues. 
Justice O’Connor argued: 
There has been a reluctance on our current Supreme Court to look to international 
or foreign law in interpreting our own Constitution and related statutes. While 
ultimately we must bear responsibility for interpreting our own laws, there is 
much to learn from other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the same 
difficult issues that we face here.
158
 
Justice O’Connor is similarly advocating for the use of reason-borrowing in United States 
courts.  Chief Justice Rehnquist also advocated for the use of decisions by other nations’ 
constitutional courts in the deliberative process of United States courts: 
For nearly a century and a half, courts in the United States exercising the power of 
judicial review had no precedents to look to save their own, because our courts 
alone exercised this sort of authority . . . . But now that constitutional law is 
solidly grounded in so many countries, it is time that the United States courts 
begin looking to the decisions of other constitutional courts to aid in their own 
deliberative process.
159
 
The views of various Justices advocating differing forms of reason-borrowing are 
indicative of its usefulness as a tool in constitutional jurisprudence.
160
 When faced with 
particularly difficult constitutional questions, which foreign constitutional courts have 
previously addressed, the process of reason-borrowing is beneficial in developing the 
Court’s own reasoning.  
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   Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the 
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 The Supreme Court has previously engaged in reason-borrowing, specifically in 
cases that have dealt with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Smith 
v. California provides an illustration of the reason-borrowing framework.
161
  In Smith, the 
Supreme Court reviewed the legality of a Los Angeles ordinance restricting the presence 
of obscene books in bookstores.
162
  Section 41.01.1 of the Municipal Code of the City of 
Los Angeles made it unlawful “for any person to have in his possession any obscene or 
indecent writing, [or] book . . . in any place of business where . . . books . . . are sold or 
kept for sale.”163  The Municipal Court of Los Angeles, and later the Superior Court of 
California, imposed a jail sentence on Mr. Smith based on the presence of a “book found 
upon judicial investigation to be obscene” in his bookstore.164  “The definition included 
no element of scienter—knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book—and thus 
the ordinance was construed as imposing a ‘strict’ or ‘absolute’ criminal liability.”165  In 
examining the application of the First and Fourteenth Amendments in Smith, Justice 
Frankfurter looked to a debate of the British House of Commons.
166
  Frankfurter noted 
that obscenity is understood in the context of “contemporary community standards.”167  
The evidence of the “contemporary community standards” requires evidentiary 
support.
168
  Frankfurter contends, “The importance of this type of evidence in 
prosecutions for obscenity has been impressively attested by the recent debates in the 
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House of Commons dealing with the insertion of such a provision in the enactment of the 
Obscene Publications Act.”169  Frankfurter was borrowing the reasoning of the House of 
Commons as support for the proposition that prosecuting obscenity requires an 
evidentiary investigation of “contemporary community standards.”  Frankfurter also 
looked to the reasoning of the Court of Appeals of New Zealand, noting, “[i]t has been 
well observed of a statute construed as dispensing with any requirement of scienter that: 
‘Every bookseller would be placed under an obligation to make himself aware of the 
contents of every book in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand so 
near an approach to omniscience.’ ”170  Once again, Frankfurter was borrowing the 
reasoning of a foreign court to lend support to his conclusion. Smith illustrates that the 
Court has and is willing to borrow reasoning from similarly situated foreign courts in 
interpreting constitutional provisions. Frankfurter relies on the reasoning of other courts 
and legislatures
171
 in arriving at a decision.  
 Similarly, Chief Justice Rehnquist in Washington v. Glucksberg,
172
 cited and 
described decisions from other nations’ constitutional courts in identifying the relevant 
“background” to evaluate the claim that the State of Washington’s prohibition on assisted 
suicide violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
173
  In Glucksberg, 
four Washington physicians who treated the terminally ill, three terminally ill patients, 
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and a nonprofit organization sought a declaration that the ban on assisted suicide was 
unconstitutional on its face.
174
  The contention was that the doctors would otherwise have 
assisted in the suicide of the patients but did not do so because of Washington’s ban on 
the practice.
175
  “[Respondents] assert[ed] a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause which extends to a personal choice by a mentally 
competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician-assisted suicide.”176  Rehnquist 
supports the proposition that there is no right to assisted suicide by citing decisions of 
multiple foreign bodies: the Supreme Court of Canada, which rejected a claim of a 
fundamental right to assisted suicide in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms;
177
 
the British House of Lords Select Committee on Medical Ethics, which refused to change 
Great Britain’s assisted-suicide prohibition;178 and New Zealand’s Parliament, which 
rejected a “Death With Dignity Bill” legalizing physician-assisted suicide.179  Again, the 
Court illustrated its willingness to borrow reasoning from foreign courts and governments 
in interpreting provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 There are two strong foundations for the Supreme Court to engage in reason-
borrowing from the ECHR’s jurisprudence regarding the legal recognition of an acquired 
sex.  First, the borrowed reasoning is from a constitutional court.  Some criticism of the 
Supreme Court has focused on the lack of reason-borrowing that is derived from 
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similarly situated constitutional courts whose focus would also be constitutional rights 
and provisions.
180
  The ECHR is tasked with interpretation of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.
181
  Cases rise to the ECHR upon an allegation that a member state 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights.  This parallels the system in the 
United States where the Supreme Court hears cases dealing with potential violations of 
the Constitution.  Decisions of the ECHR are binding on the parties including member 
states.  Again, this parallels the United States, where decisions made by the Supreme 
Court are binding on the parties to the case.  Given the somewhat parallel tasks of the 
Supreme Court and the ECHR, borrowing the reasoning of the ECHR would be 
appropriate.  Second, the specific provisions of the European Convention on Human 
Rights are analogous to the Due Process Clause protections of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  An advocate for the recognition of the transsexuals’ rights in their acquired 
sex should argue that the Supreme Court borrows ECHR reasoning in three areas: privacy 
and liberty, sex discrimination, and the awareness of an emergent treatment of post-
operative transsexuals.  By borrowing from the reasoning of the ECHR, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause should be interpreted to protect the right of post-
operative transsexuals to be recognized in their acquired sex.  
B. Borrowing the ECHR Reasoning on Privacy and Liberty 
A primary concern expressed by the ECHR was that a prohibition on the right of post-
operative transsexuals to marry in their acquired sex constituted a violation of their 
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privacy under Article 8 of the Convention.
182
  Although the right to privacy is not 
explicitly present in the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that privacy is a 
protected Constitutional right under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause and substantive due process in a line of cases—Griswold v. 
Connecticut,
183
Eisenstadt v. Baird,
184
 and Roe v. Wade.
185
  In Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Supreme Court found:  
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life.
186
 
For people with gender identity disorder, making the decision to live the life as a member 
of the gender with which you identify is an intimate and personal decision that is tied to 
essential conceptions of autonomy and dignity; it is fundamental to defining “one’s own 
concept of existence.”187  The underlying argument ties together privacy and liberty.  As 
Justice Kennedy noted in Lawrence v. Texas, “the individual [has a] right to make certain 
unusually important decisions that will affect his own or his family’s destiny.”188 
 The position of the ECHR provides the reasoning necessary to complete a privacy and 
liberty argument for recognizing a person’s acquired sex.  The ECHR concluded “that 
serious interference with private life can arise where the state of domestic law conflicts 
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with an important aspect of personal identity.”189  Specifically, the ECHR held that “[t]he 
stress and alienation arising from a discordance between the position in society assumed 
by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by law which refuses to recognise 
the change of gender cannot . . . be regarded as inconvenience arising from a 
formality.”190 
 The view espoused by the ECHR parallels the position taken by the Supreme 
Court in Casey
191
 and Lawrence,
192
 which generally hold that certain personal decisions 
ought to be protected.  As the Supreme Court noted in Lawrence, “our laws and tradition 
afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”193  Borrowing the 
reasoning established in the ECHR and applying it to the view expressed by the Supreme 
Court provides strong ground for the position that post-operative transsexuals should 
have the right to get married in their acquired sex. 
C. Borrowing the ECHR Reasoning on Sex Discrimination 
 Advocates for transsexual rights should also utilize reason-borrowing from the 
ECHR’s approach by finding that denying transsexuals the right to marry in their 
acquired sex is sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Supreme Court first applied the Equal Protection Clause to sex 
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discrimination in Craig v. Boren.
194
  The Court established that “classifications by gender 
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.”195  Since Craig v. Boren, a series of cases have led the 
Supreme Court to raise the threshold of intermediate scrutiny.
196
  As Justice Ginsburg 
explains in U.S. v. Virginia, “[t]o summarize the Court’s current directions for cases of 
official classification based on gender: Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of 
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the 
proffered justification is ‘exceedingly persuasive.’ ”197  The government carries the 
burden under intermediate scrutiny as outlined in U.S. v. Virginia.  As Ginsburg notes, 
“[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”198 
 The reasoning of the ECHR provides a strong parallel to the view of sex 
discrimination outlined by the Supreme Court.  The ECHR indicated that the primary 
problem in the treatment of post-operative transsexuals is “discordance between the 
position in society assumed by a post-operative transsexual and the status imposed by law 
which refuses to recognize the change of [sex].”199  The view is that the denial of the 
right to be recognized in one’s acquired sex is a denial of the sex in which the person 
lives their life, a sex that is medically prescribed.  The result is that the government, in 
choosing not to recognize a post-operative transsexual’s sex, is discriminating against the 
transsexual based upon his/her actual lived sex.  As the ECHR notes, non-recognition has 
                                                 
 194 
429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
 195 
Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
 196 
See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 
(1982). 
 197 
518 U.S. 515, 532–533 (1996). 
 198 
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533. 
199     
Goodwin v. United Kingdom, App. No. 28957/95, 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 447, para. 76, 77 (2 
 33 
its most substantial “effects on the applicant’s life where sex is of legal relevance and 
distinctions are made between men and women.”200  The impact of not recognizing a 
person’s acquired sex is to discriminate inherently against them in instances when sex 
matters.  The contention is that non-recognition leads to discrimination against a person 
based upon the sex that person has acquired.  Once a transsexual has had a sex-change 
operation, the decision to deny legal rights based upon his or her sex unjustifiably limits 
the individual’s basic legal and political rights.201  Advocates for transsexual rights 
should borrow the ECHR reasoning that discrimination against post-operative 
transsexuals is sex discrimination.
202
  Importing this reasoning would bring consistency 
to the United States’ position and protect the rights of post-operative transsexuals from 
unlawful sex discrimination.
203
 
 Further supporting the sex equality approach is the fact that the Supreme Court 
includes discrimination based on gender in its definition of sex discrimination.  The 
inclusion of gender within sex discrimination permits transsexuals a stronger foundation 
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for a sex discrimination claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.  The Supreme Court’s 
primary contention in sex discrimination cases focuses on the social (gender) rather than 
the biological (sex) concerns.
204
  The Court continuously uses sex and gender as proxies 
for one another, indicating that they are linked.  The first, most stark, and most 
unpleasant evidence of the connection was present in Bradwell v. Illinois, in which 
Justice Bradley noted:  
The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. . . . The paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife 
and mother. This is the law of the Creator.
205
 
Bradley was making the claim that the biological characteristics of women incline them 
to certain social positions.
206
 Bradley’s position sees an immutable bind between sex and 
gender. Although Bradwell is admittedly a very old case, it has never been overruled and 
thus is still good law.  
 The interchangeability of sex and gender can also be seen in Title VII cases. 
Under Title VII, gender discrimination is prohibited as sex discrimination.  The Supreme 
Court in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins held that sex-type stereotyping was a sex-based 
violation of Title VII.
207
  The Court noted, “[W]hen a plaintiff in a Title VII case proves 
that her gender played a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant may 
avoid a finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
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would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into 
account.”208  The Court also indicated,  
[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group, 
for in forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their 
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of 
men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.
209
 
The Supreme Court has not expressly proffered such a strong position on the connection 
of sex and gender under the Equal Protection Clause.  But it has continued to view or 
consider sex and gender as bound, and gender discrimination as impermissible under the 
Equal Protection Clause.  In Craig v. Boren, the Court found a “gender-based” difference 
in drinking age unconstitutional.
210
  The Court even noted that the primary basis for 
discrimination was social stereotyping.
211
  In U.S. v. Virginia, the Court found “official 
classification based on gender” to be impressible.212  The Court objected to 
discrimination that is based upon social categories, specifically the distinct “capacities,” 
“tendencies,” and “preferences” of men and women.213 
 The focus on gender discrimination as impermissible discrimination under the 
Equal Protection Clause indicates both that the Court sees sex and gender as connected 
and that the Court finds gender discrimination impermissible.  In fact, prohibited sex 
discrimination is founded on “principally social meaning [gender] in legal 
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application.”214  Therefore, U.S. courts acknowledge that what is called sex 
discrimination applies to discrimination based on both sex and gender.
215
 
 The rhetorical interchangeability of sex and gender as applied by U.S. federal 
courts indicates that gender is an important part of Fourteenth Amendment sex 
discrimination claims.  The view forwarded by U.S. federal courts is commensurate with 
the ECHR’s view regarding the importance that gender plays in determining a person’s 
sex.
216
  The ECHR noted that gender is a critical part in assessing a person’s sex.217  For a 
post-operative transsexual, a medical decision was made to align sex and gender.
218
  Non-
recognition of the acquired sex by U.S. courts is in direct contrast to the medical decision, 
which presupposes that a person can fully transition into the new sex.
219
 
 As the ECHR notes, the goal of sex reassignment surgery is “achieving as one of 
its principal purposes as close an assimilation as possible to the gender in which the 
transsexual perceives that he or she properly belongs.”220  This view indicates that gender 
is an important part of sex.  Denying a person the ability to marry as a member of their 
acquired sex would discriminate against the person’s gender—namely because people 
whose gender aligns with their sex are allowed to marry people of the opposite sex, but 
people whose gender and sex do not align at birth and then have sex reassignment 
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surgery to align their sex and gender are denied the right to marry people opposite of their 
acquired sex.  The clear interchangeability of sex and gender in equal protection sex 
discrimination cases in the United States indicates that not recognizing the sex identity of 
post-operative transsexuals should be considered a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
 A challenge to the sex and gender discrimination position could be made to the 
effect that post-operative transsexuals can still marry someone opposite of their born sex.  
But the ECHR provides strong reasoning that could be borrowed to indicate that this 
position is tenuous at best.  The ECHR held “that it is artificial to assert that post-
operative transsexuals have not been deprived of the right to marry as, according to law, 
they remain able to marry a person of their former opposite sex.”221  Post-operative 
transsexuals want to align their sex and gender, and, if they additionally want to fit into 
traditional sex and gender roles, they often want to marry a person that is opposite their 
acquired sex.  Denying them the right to marry someone opposite the sex they have 
acquired would deny them a basic right that belongs to members of their acquired sex.  
The ECHR noted that a person who acquires a sex and wants to marry someone opposite 
of that sex is denied the very right of that sex in marriage, thus “the very essence of her 
right to marry has been infringed.”222 
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D. Borrowing the ECHR Reasoning on the Awareness of an Emergent Treatment  
of Post-Operative Transsexuals 
 Transsexual rights advocates should acknowledge the continuing trend toward the 
recognition of the rights of post-operative transsexuals in their acquired sex.  The 
Supreme Court has acknowledged that an examination of a legislative or legal movement 
can be important in assessing equal protection claims.
223
  The conclusions of the ECHR 
along with the research that was done in arriving at that conclusion could be borrowed to 
illustrate a movement toward recognition.  The Interdepartmental Working Group on 
Transsexual People found that the growing demand and recognition of the legal rights of 
transsexuals in their acquired sex made a significant impression on the ECHR.
224
  The 
ECHR concluded that the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People and 
its findings constituted an acknowledgement of the changing societal status of 
transsexuals in the United Kingdom and Europe more generally.
225
 
 The movement within the United States toward recognition further supports this 
conclusion.  Twenty-four states allow post-operative transsexuals to change their birth 
certificate to recognize their acquired sex, while only two states do not allow for the 
change of sex to be recognized on a birth certificate.
226
  In addition, the medical 
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community seems to be converging on the position that a sex change operation allows 
transsexuals to attain their proper sex. 
227
 
E.  If the U.S. Borrows the Reasoning of the ECHR, it should be Mindful not to 
Further Conflate Sex and Gender. 
 The primary problem with recognizing the post-operative sex of a transsexual is 
that it may further lend credence to the misconception that sex and gender are either the 
same or are dimorphic and connected.
228
  As noted above, the Supreme Court often 
mistakes sex as a biological category and gender as a social category.  If recognition of 
the right for transsexuals to marry in their acquired sex is tied to jurisprudence that 
indicates that sex discrimination contains both discrimination based on sex and gender, it 
may work to reify the connection between the two.    
 The conflation of these terms can lead to a fiction of coherence, imposing a 
correlation between biological sex and gender.
229
  The result is that the acceptable 
standard for someone who is female is to act like a woman and be feminine, while a male 
would act like a man and be masculine.
230
  Correlating sex and gender into this fictive 
coherence may further stigmatize individuals who do not adhere to the dimorphism.  The 
end result may be that people who do not align their sex and gender to each other will be 
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marginalized.
231
  For example, recognizing the post-operative sex of transsexuals may 
stigmatize people who are transgendered and choose not to have sex reassignment 
surgery.  Females who act masculine may be subject to scrutiny for not aligning their sex 
with their gender.  The position of transsexuals in Iran is one indication of this potential 
problem.  Since 1983 sex reassignment surgery has been legal in Iran.
232
  “Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the spiritual leader of the 1979 Islamic revolution, passed a fatwa - a religious 
edict - authorizing them for ‘diagnosed transsexuals.’  Today, Iran carries out more sex 
change operations than any other nation in the world except for Thailand.”233  
Meanwhile, homosexuality is still criminal in Iran.
234
  The result is that there often is 
social pressure on homosexuals to have sex reassignment surgery.
235
  The pressure is 
created because homosexuals are viewed as people trapped in the wrong sex.
236
  The 
conflation in the Iranian case is between sexuality and sex, but this is primarily driven by 
the view that homosexuals are gender feminine.
237
  The pressure on homosexuals to have 
sex reassignment surgery is persistent despite doctors knowing that there is a significant 
difference between homosexuals and transsexuals.
238
  Conflating sex, gender, and 
sexuality may lead to such repercussions and some caution ought to be paid in ensuring 
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that legal positions that protect the rights of post-operative transsexuals do not lead to 
such misconceptions. 
SECTION 4. 
Conclusion 
 Exploring the Anglo-American legal system’s treatment of the acquired sex of 
post-operative transsexuals exposes the tenuous nature of the category of sex.  It also 
reveals the potential consequences of legal decisions attempting to codify sex at birth. 
Although we may be reluctant to acknowledge it, traditional conceptions of sex are just 
as easily and erroneously constructed, both socially and legally, as race.  However, there 
have been advances in recognizing the difficulties of a rigid categorization focusing 
solely on biological factors at birth.  
 The United Kingdom has advanced further than the United States in this respect, 
and the United Kingdom’s progress presents a set of legal arguments that may help to 
resolve the lack of continuity in the United States’ system.  The United Kingdom’s 
acknowledgment that non-recognition is a form of sex discrimination comports well with 
the sex discrimination view articulated in the U.S. jurisprudence.  Advancing a sex 
equality approach in recognizing the acquired sex of post-operative transsexuals could 
elevate the issues from states to federal courts and bring coherence to the treatment of 
post-operative transsexuals in the United States. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
THE IMPACT OF SEX IDENTIFICATION AND TESTING IN ATHLETICS 
 The concept of "fair play" is invoked in sex segregation because female and male 
bodies are biologically different.  These differences are understood to give a general 
advantage to male athletes.  But, the desire to segregate the sexes for competitive sports 
runs into one significant problem: when athletes do not neatly fit into traditional 
biological definitions of male or female. 
 The traditional view of sex segregated sports is that male athletes have a 
biological competitive advantage over female athletes.  This view is rooted in biological 
realities of the shape of male and female bodies.  Males tend to have “longer arms, bigger 
and stronger legs, more muscle fiber, ten percent larger hearts and lungs, and stronger 
and broader shoulders.”239  Males' larger hearts result in 16 percent more blood pumped 
per heartbeat.
240
  Larger male lungs result in 25 to 30 percent higher oxygen 
consumption; elite male athletes have maximum oxygen consumption that is about 10 
percent higher than their female counterparts.
241
  These attributes tend to give male 
athletes an advantage in competitions that require pure strength.   
 These physical differences between males and females are the primary reason 
there is such concern about male athletes competing in female competitions.  The 
assumption is that these biological differences significantly advantage male athletes.  If 
athletes who have genetic advantages resulting from higher androgen levels are 
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competing with female athletes who do not have similarly elevated levels of androgens, 
the view is that the latter will be at a significant disadvantage.   
 In this Chapter I explore the history of sex testing in sports, focusing on both 
transsexual and intersex athletes participating in female competition.  By delineating the 
mechanism and rationale behind sex testing and the history and impact sex testing has 
had on transsexual and intersex athletes, I highlight the issues and consequences of sex 
testing and sex segregated sports.  Sex testing illuminates the difficulty in arriving at 
bright-line rules in distinguishing male from female in certain cases.  Sex testing also has 
the unforeseen consequence of asserting that female athletes are disadvantaged as 
compared to male athletes. 
 I begin this Chapter by tracing the history of sex testing in international sports.  I 
then trace the significant events in participation by transsexual and intersexual athletes.  
Finally, I explore the underlying assumption that female athletes are disadvantaged and 
why this assumption may be inaccurate.       
 
SECTION 1. 
The History of Sex Testing in International Sports 
 Formalized sex testing in competitive athletic competitions began in the 1960s.
242
  
The Olympics instituted their first official sex testing practices for the 1968 Games.
243
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During the 1968 Olympics, sex testing consisted of a visual inspection of each female 
athlete to ensure a proper female phenotype.
244
  Athletes complained that the test was 
invasive and degrading.
245
  Phenotype testing was imprecise and at times led to 
inconclusive or erroneous results.   
 Both the inaccurate testing and the athletes' privacy concerns led most sporting 
events to change to a chromosomal test (such as the Barr body test) or a DNA test (such 
as a polymerase chain reaction test).
246
  The most often used test was the Barr body test.  
The Barr body test detects the presence of two X chromosomes indicating that a person is 
female or an X and a Y chromosome indicating that a person is a male.   
 The International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), the governing body of 
amateur athletics, officially ceased subjecting all female athletes to sex testing in 1991.
247
  
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) officially ceased subjecting all female 
athletes to sex testing in 2000.
248
  Yet, both the IAAF and the IOC continue to subject 
select individual female athletes to sex testing.
249
  The number of individual sex tests 
conducted is unknown because the IOC and the IAAF attempt to conduct these tests 
confidentially to secure the privacy of athletes.
250
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 The individual athlete testing protocol is more elaborate and undertakes to 
evaluate multiple components of sex in determining the sex of an athlete.
251
  
Individualized testing can include the use of a gynecologist, endocrinologist, internist, 
psychologist, and gender expert.
252
  The rules first established in 2006 created five 
categories of athletes eligible to compete in female athletic events.
253
 
 First, if an athlete is phenotypically and genotypically female. 
 Second, “if sex change operations as well as appropriate hormone replacement 
therapy are performed before puberty then the athlete is allowed to compete as a 
female.”254  The implication is that sex reassignment before puberty ensures that a male-
to-female transsexual does not obtain the advantages associated with a major influx of 
testosterone during puberty.   
 Third, “if the sex change and hormone therapy is done after puberty then the 
athlete has to wait two years after a gonadectomy before a physical and endocrinological 
evaluation is conducted.”255  The rationale for this rule is once again centered on the 
advantage of being exposed to elevated testosterone levels.  “The crux of the matter is 
that the athlete should not be enjoying the benefits of natural testosterone predominance 
normally seen in a male.”256 
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 Fourth are a series of intersex conditions that “accord no advantage over other 
females.”257  They include: androgen insensitivity syndrome, gonadal digenesis, and 
Turner’s syndrome.258 
 Fifth are a series of intersex conditions that “accord some advantages but 
nevertheless [are] acceptable.”259  The list includes: congenital adrenal hyperplasia, 
androgen producing tumors, and an ovulatory androgen excess (polycystic ovary 
syndrome).
260
 
 This leaves an unspoken sixth class of applicants: those who are determined not to 
be female and are excluded from completion.   
 For the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing, China, the IOC established a 
laboratory to conduct sex testing.
261
  In 2010 the IOC announced the expansion of the 
laboratory program and the desire to set up more testing centers.
262
  In 2010 the IOC and 
the IAAF once again revisited the issue of sex testing, given concerns over whether and 
how to include intersex athletes with hyperandrogenism.
263
 
 The conferences held to examine this issue resulted in two general conclusions.  
First, “in order to protect the health of the athlete, sports authorities should have the 
responsibility to make sure that any case of female hyperandrogenism that arises under 
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their jurisdiction receives adequate medical follow-up.”264  Second, “rules need to be put 
into place to regulate the participation of athletes with hyperandrogenism in competitions 
for women.”265  The final rules established for the 2012 Summer Olympics in London, 
England, held that if “the investigated athlete has female hyperandrogenism that confers a 
competitive advantage (because it is functional and the androgen level is in the male 
range), the investigated athlete may be declared ineligible to compete in the 2012 
[Olympics].”266 
 The conferences dealing with hyperandrogenism led the IOC to reexamine its 
general rules for sex testing.  First, “A female recognized in law should be eligible to 
compete in female competitions provided that she has androgen levels below the male 
range . . . or, if within the male range, she has an androgen resistance such that she 
derives no competitive advantage from such levels.”267  The language focuses on the need 
to ensure that female athletes gain no competitive advantage from their status.  
Additionally, the rule places the responsibility on legal institutions to make 
determinations about an athlete’s sex.  
 Second, all evaluations must be anonymous and, “[s]hould an athlete be 
considered ineligible to compete, she would be notified of the reasons why, and informed 
of the conditions she would be required to meet should she wish to become eligible 
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again.”268  The second rule presents a possibility for athletes to seek further treatment to 
reduce competitive advantage and bring them within the eligibility requirement for a 
female athlete. 
 Finally, the IOC explained the rationale behind testing protocols.  “Although rare, 
some women develop male-like body characteristics due to an overproduction of male 
sex hormones, so-called ‘androgens.’  The androgenic effects on the human body explain 
why men perform better than women in most sports and are, in fact, the very reason for 
the distinction between male and female competition in most sports.”269  The IOC’s 
policy is entirely dependent on creating a rationale for sex separation where female 
athletes are protected from competition with “better” male athletes. 
 The history of the participation of transsexual and intersex athletes illustrates why 
these changes have occurred and the consequences for transsexual and intersex athletes, 
as well as female athletes.  This section continues by examining the case of Renee 
Richards and her participation in the U.S. Open Tennis Tournament before examining 
several high profile instances involving intersex athletes.    
A. The Case of Renee Richards and Participation by Transsexual Athletes in  
Female Sports 
 In the history of sex testing there may be no case more controversial than that of 
Dr. Renee Richards.  Her case is also noteworthy because she is the only athlete to date to 
reach out to the courts to obtain permission to compete as a female athlete.  The 
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reasoning underlying the court's decision is illustrative of the concerns that underpin sex 
testing and its role in sport.   
 Dr. Renee Richards was born Richard Raskind.
270
  She had been an 
ophthalmologist, husband, and father when she underwent a sex reassignment surgery.
271
  
Before her surgery she was "an accomplished male tennis player" and ranked 3rd in the 
East and 13th in the United States overall for men over 35 years-old.
272
  After her 
operation Richards wanted to again participate in competitive tennis tournaments, but in 
the women's division.  Before applying for the 1976 United States Open, Richards 
entered nine women's tennis tournaments winning twice and finishing as a runner-up 
three times.
273
 
 In 1976 the Unites States Tennis Association (USTA) and the United States Open 
Committee (USOC) for the first time implemented the Barr body test (sex-chromatin test) 
to confirm the sex of female athletes.
274
  The Barr body test had been employed by the 
International Olympic Committee starting in the 1968 Olympics.
275
  Both the USTA and 
the USOC acknowledged that they implemented the Barr body test as a direct result of 
Richards application to enter the U.S. Open as a female tennis player.
276
  Previously, the 
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U.S. Open only implemented a phenotype test (an observation of primary and secondary 
sexual characteristics) in establishing the sex of an athlete.
277
 
 The USTA and the USOC contended the Barr body test was implemented to 
ensure fairness.
278
  Their primary claim was that those who have had sex reassignment 
surgery have a competitive advantage over natural-born female athletes.  The advantage 
is gained from "physical training and development as a male."
279
  George E. Gowen of 
the USTA noted, "'We have reason to believe that there are as many as 10,000 
transsexuals in the United States and many more female impersonators or imposters.  The 
total number of such persons throughout the world is not known.'"
280
  Gowen indicated 
that the USTA was concerned about cheating and the use of "'experiments . . . , to 
produce athletic stars by means undreamed of a few years ago.'"
281
  USTA's apparent 
concern was over the infusion of male athletes having sex reassignment surgery in order 
to enter into female competitions.
282
  The Barr body test would bar those athletes who 
had undergone sex reassignment surgery to maintain “‘its obligation to assure 
fairness.'"
283
 
 The USTA and the USOC introduced testimony by Dr. Daniel Federman, 
professor and chairman of the Department of Medicine at Stanford University, who, in 
part, testified that the presence of the Y chromosome provides "'physical characteristics 
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in the normal male that affect an individual's competitive athletic ability.'"
284
  Federman 
explained that the Y chromosome and the correspondingly higher levels of androgen 
(male sex hormone) to estrogen (female sex hormone) results in “‘greater height, 
different body proportions, and a higher muscle mass.'"
285
  He also testified that sex 
reassignment surgery would not impact many of these advantages.  "'In the adult male 
beyond puberty, neither the removal of the testes by sex reassignment surgery, nor any 
subsequent treatment with estrogen can affect the individual's achieved height or skeletal 
structure.'"
286
  Indeed, sex reassignment surgery alone would not reduce male 
musculature either.
287
  "'Removal of the testes plus ingestion of estrogens can reduce 
male strength, but any such effect is partial and depends upon continued ingestion of 
estrogen to be sustained.'"
288
  Thus, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual would 
still possess the competitive physical attributes of a male and could only hope to reduce 
male musculature through continued use of estrogen.
289
  Federman's testimony supported 
the view that transsexual athletes would possess an unfair advantage physically because 
they retained male physical attributes.
290
 
 The USTA and the USOC also introduced affidavits from professional female 
tennis players attesting to the advantage of postoperative male-to-female transsexuals in 
competing against natural-born female athletes.
291
  Francoise Durr, Janet Newberry, and 
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Kristen K. Shaw each testified that, assuming similar skill levels, a former male has a 
significant advantage both from being taller and stronger.
292
  The position supports the 
conclusion that inherent height and strength advantage conferred by being born male (or 
possessing a Y chromosome) can result in competitive advantage.
293
  Vicki Berner, 
Director of Women's Tennis for the USTA, a former successful professional tennis 
player, stated, "she was unable to find a record of any woman player over age 40 who has 
had such a successful competitive record as [Richards], a record unparalleled in the 
history of women's professional tennis."
294
  The implication of Berner's statement is that 
Richards' success could only be explained by the competitive advantage she obtained by 
being born male.
295
  The testimony of these professional tennis players all indicated that 
Richards had a competitive advantage. 
 Dr. Roberto Granato, the surgeon who performed Richards' sex reassignment 
surgery, testified that Richards did not possess a competitive advantage over female 
athletes.
296
  Granato testified that the removal of the testes and estrogen therapy reduced 
androgen levels and decreases muscular mass.
297
  Granato also stated that Richards' 
muscle to fat ratio corresponded to a female body, including breast development.
298
  His 
contention was that Richards' "'muscle development, weight, height, and physique fit 
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within the female norm.'"
299
  His ultimate conclusion was that Richards, "should be 
considered a woman, classified as a female and allowed to compete as such."
300
 
 Dr. Jon Money, a psychologist and professor practitioner at Johns Hopkins 
Medical School, whom Richards had consulted, testified that Richards was female and 
did not have a competitive advantage.
301
  Money testified that the Bar body test would 
have an unjust effect if applied to Richards because all other indicators were that she was 
female.
302
  He explained:  
[Dr. Richards] external genital appearance is that of a female; her internal sex is 
that of a female who has been hysterectomized and ovariectomized; Dr. Richards 
is psychologically a woman; endrochronologically female; somatically (muscular 
tone, height, weight, breasts, physique) Dr. Richards is female and her muscular 
and fat composition has been transformed to that of a female; socially Dr. 
Richards is female; Dr. Richards' gonadal status is that of an ovariectomized 
female.
303
 
Money argued that all of these factors meant that Richards must be recognized as a 
female "and for anyone in the medical or legal field to find otherwise is completely 
unjustified."
304
  He argued that Richards would "have no unfair advantage when 
competing against other women."
305
  This conclusion was based on Richards fitting 
within the "female norm" for "muscle development, weight, height and physique."
306
 
 Finally, Richards introduced the testimony of professional tennis player Billie 
Jean King who supported Richards' competing as a female in tennis tournaments.
307
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King had participated as a doubles teammate with Richards and had competed in two 
singles tournaments where Richards also participated.
308
  King testified: "'[Richards] does 
not enjoy physical superiority or strength so as to have an advantage over women 
competitors in the sport of tennis.'"
309
 
 The court ruled in Richards' favor, deciding that she did not have an advantage 
over other female athletes and ought to be considered a female and admitted as such in 
the U.S. Open.
310
  The court held, "the requirement of [the USTA and the USOC] that 
[Richards] pass the Barr body test in order to be eligible to participate in the women's 
singles of the U.S. Open is grossly unfair, and violative of her rights under the Human 
Rights Law of [New York]."
311
  But the court did not eliminate the Barr body test as a 
method of determining sex, "as it appears to be a recognized and acceptable tool for 
determining sex.  However it is not and should not be the sole criterion, whereas here, the 
circumstances warrant consideration of other factors."
312
  Instead the court noted that 
"[t]he only justification for using a sex discrimination test in athletic competition is to 
prevent fraud, i.e. men masquerading as women, competing against women."
313
 Ultimately, the court did not find justification for precluding Richards because she 
was advantaged, noting "the unfounded fears and misconceptions of [the USTA and the 
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USOC] must give way to the overwhelming medical evidence that this person is now a 
female."
314
 
 The Richards decision represents a significant victory for the recognition of 
transsexuals both in sport and in society.  The case remains the only legal decision 
regarding transsexuals participating in sports in their acquired sex.  But, Richards' case 
also presents a significant problem in the way we conceptualize female athletic 
competition.  The decision was predicated on Richards not having an advantage over 
other female competitors.  The advantage was her retaining any male characteristics.  The 
court concluded that her competing with other females was appropriate because she no 
longer possessed those advantages.  Her sex reassignment surgery and hormone therapy 
suppressed the benefits of her Y chromosome.  The court's reasoning supports a view that 
femaleness is a disability as compared to maleness.  From an athletic stand point 
possessing a Y chromosome and obtaining its benefits is an enhancement for a female 
athlete.  
 After the Richards decision several sports now include transsexuals that compete 
as female athletes.  Among those athletes are: Mianne Bagger a Danish born Australian 
golfer who competes on the Ladies European Tour, Canadian cyclist Kristen Worley, and 
Canadian mountain biker Michelle Dumaresq.
315
 
B. Case Studies of Intersex Athletes Participating in Female Sports 
 The history of intersex athletes in the Olympics illustrates the difficulty with sex 
testing protocols.  Often intersex athletes are unaware of their condition and are raised as 
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female.  Sex testing can expose their condition to the world and to themselves.  In 
addition, because of changes in sex-testing protocols the timing of an athlete's exposure 
to testing can often be the difference between being labeled female or male.  Finally, 
while the protocols may change, the focus has always remained on eliminating 
competitive advantages that intersex athletes may possess.    
 Stainislawa Walasiewicz, known as Stella Walsh, was a Polish immigrant living 
in the United States when she competed for Poland in the 1932 and 1936 Summer 
Olympics.
316
  Walsh was a very successful sprinter in the 1930s, setting or matching the 
100 meter sprint world record time on six occasions.
317
  Her final world record time stood 
for 11 years.
318
  One of her world record times was captured at the 1932 Olympics in Los 
Angeles, California.
319
  Four years later in Berlin she attempted to duplicate her feat.
320
  
Instead, she was defeated by United States sprinter Helen Stephens.
321
  Polish media 
questioned the victory claiming that Stephens was male and masquerading as female.
322
  
Responding to the accusations, the IOC conducted a visual inspection of Stephens’s 
external genitalia and confirmed that she was female.
323
 
 In December 1980, Stella Walsh was shot and killed during a robbery in 
Cleveland, Ohio.
324
  During her autopsy the coroner, Samuel Gerber, discovered that 
                                                 
316
   Paul Farhi, The Runner’s Secret, THE WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 22, 2008) (available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/21/AR2008082103680.html).  
317
   Id. 
318
   Id. 
319
   Id. 
320
   Id. 
321
   Id. 
322
   Id. 
323
   Id. 
324
   Id. 
 57 
Walsh “had no internal female reproductive organs, and possessed an underdeveloped 
and non-functioning penis, ‘masculine’ breasts and an abnormal urinary opening.”325  
Gerber determined that Walsh’s sex was “likely ambiguous at birth” and that her parents 
choose to raise her as a girl.
326
  Gerber concluded, “Walsh ‘lived and died a female . . . . 
Socially, culturally and legally, Stella Walsh was accepted as a female for 69 years.’”327 
Walsh, in fact, had “mosaicism, a mutation that causes some cells to be XY and others to 
be XX."
328
  The IOC decided not to strip Walsh of her medals.
329
 
 The 1936 Olympics also included a controversy surrounding Dora Ratjen (aka 
Heinrich Ratjen).
330
  Ratjen competed in the Olympics as a female high jumper and 
placed fourth.  At birth he was identified as female and his parents raised him as 
female.
331
  When he hit puberty he realized that his outward appearance was not female 
and began to think he was male.
332
  Nonetheless Ratjen continued to compete as a female 
in athletic competitions.
333
  In 1938, on a train ride from Vienna to Cologne the 
conductor reported that a male was on the train dressed as a woman.
334
  Police 
investigated and Ratjen explained his story and produced documents identifying him as 
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male.
335
  A physician examined Ratjen and identified him as male.
336
  He concluded, 
"'The secondary sexual characteristics are entirely male.' . . . . However the doctor did 
note one distinctive feature: 'A thick band of scar tissue running backwards from the 
underside of the penis in a relatively broad line.'"
337
  Ratjen's scarring is the likely reason 
he was identified at birth as female.
338
  Prosecutors ultimately dropped the fraud charges 
against Ratjen.
339
  The lead prosecutor noted, "'Fraud cannot be deemed to have taken 
place, . . . [h]is activities and relations were always feminine.'"
340
  Despite the decision, 
Ratjen was stripped of his competitive success and participation in sports as a female.
341
  
Unfortunately Ratjen's sex was left in limbo for a period of time while authorities 
attempted to determine if he should be considered male or female, precluding him from 
participating in sports altogether.
342
 
 In the 1964 Summer Olympics in Tokyo, Japan, Ewa Klobukowska, representing 
Poland, won a gold medal in the 4 x 100 relay and a bronze medal in the 100 meter 
sprint.
343
  In the 1965 World Championships in Prague, Czechoslovakia, she set the world 
record in the 100 meter sprint.
344
  In 1966 she earned gold medals in the 4 x 100 relay and 
the 100 meter sprint and a silver medal in the 200 meter sprint.
345
  But, at the 1967 
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European Cup in Kiev, Ukraine, Klobukowska failed a phenotype sex test.
346
  She was 
later diagnosed with XX/XXY mosaicism.
347
  During her childhood Klobukowska had 
testes surgically removed and underwent estrogen treatment.
348
  She was stripped of her 
medals and records and banned from competition as a female athlete.
349
  If Klobukowska 
had foregone the European Cup and instead participated only in the 1968 Olympics in 
Mexico City, she would have been exposed to a Barr body test and would have been 
eligible to compete.
350
 
 In 1966 Austrian Erik Schinegger (then known as Erika) won the gold medal in 
women's downhill skiing at the World Championships in Portillo, Chile.
351
  Schinegger 
was even named Austrian athlete of the year.
352
  In 1968 Schinegger was set to compete 
in the Olympics in Grenoble, France.
353
  Schinegger was subjected to the Barr body test 
and was identified as having male chromosomes which precluded him from participating 
in the Olympics.
354
  Further medical testing determined that Schinegger had male 
genitalia that had not descended before birth or after.
355
  Schinegger was raised as a 
female because an external examination indicated a female phenotype.
356
 Schinegger 
                                                 
346
   Id. 
347
   Id. 
348
   Id. 
349
   Id. 
350
   Id. 
351
   John Fry, The Story of Modern Skiing, 131-32 (2006).   
352
   Id. 
353
   Id. 
354
   Id. 
355
   Id. 
356
   Id. 
 60 
eventually underwent surgery and treatment.
357
  He went on to marry and have 
children.
358
  Schinegger was never stripped of his World Championship medal.
359
 
María José Martínez-Patiño was a Spanish hurdler.
360
  In 1983 she underwent sex 
verification at the World Track & Field Championships in Helsinki, Finland.
361
  The test 
result indicated that she was female, and she competed.
362
  In 1985 at the World 
University Games in Kobe, Japan, her Barr body test indicated that she was male and she 
was not allowed to compete.
363
  She was told to feign injury and no longer compete as a 
female.
364
  In 1986 she competed in the Spanish championships as a female and won the 
60 meter hurdles.
365
  Martínez-Patiño was stripped of her victory and kicked off of the 
Spanish national team.
366
  Martínez-Patiño challenged her disqualification.
367
  She 
explained, "I knew that I was a woman, and that my genetic difference gave me no unfair 
physical advantage.  I could hardly pretend to be a man; I have breasts and a vagina.  I 
never cheated.  I fought my disqualification."
368
  In 1988 the IAAF reinstated her 
eligibility.
369
  Martínez-Patiño demonstrated that she had Androgen Insensitivity 
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Disorder.
370
  While she possessed XY chromosomes, her body did not properly process 
androgen leaving her with female sex characteristics.
371
  Unfortunately, Martínez-Patiño's 
reinstatement came too late in her career, and she failed to qualify for the 1992 
Olympics.
372
  Martínez-Patiño demonstrated the need to have a more efficient system and 
rules in arriving at sex determination for organized sports.
373
 
 Edinanci Silva was a judoka competitor for Brazil.
374
  She competed in the 1996, 
2000, and 2004 Olympics.
375
  Silva was born with both male and female genitalia and 
had surgery in the 1990s choosing to live her life as a female.
376
  After her surgery the 
IOC recognized her as female for competition purposes.
377
 
 Santhi Soundarajan was an elite middle distance runner representing India in 
international competition before being disqualified after a sex test.
378
  Soundarajan was 
born into the Dalits, the lowest caste in India, previously known as the untouchables.
379
  
She learned to run when she was 13, and her abilities catapulted her to victories on the 
track and to scholarships in the classroom.
380
  She attended university on a track 
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scholarship and was successful in international meets.
381
  In 2005 she took the silver 
medal in the 800 meters at the Asian Athletics Championships in South Korea.
382
  A year 
later she represented India in the Asian Games in Doha, Qatar.
383
  She again claimed the 
silver medal in the 800 meters.
384
  The day after the race she was brought in for a sex 
test.
385
  She was subjected to examination by a gynecologist and endocrinologist and a 
series of lab tests.
386
  The next day she was told to leave the Asian Games.
387
  
Soundarajan was diagnosed with Androgen Insensitivity Disorder.
388
  She was stripped of 
her medals and banned from competing as a female athlete.
389
  After the controversy 
surrounding her sex, Soundarajan attempted suicide.
390
  She eventually recovered and 
now works making bricks at a kiln in her home and coaching other runners.
391
  But, she 
still wishes that she could run competitively.
392
 
 The most recent sex testing controversy surrounds South African middle distance 
runner Caster Semenya.
393
  Semenya made her international debut at the 2008 World 
Junior Championships in Poland.
394
  At the 2008 Commonwealth Youth Games she won 
gold in the 800 meters.
395
  At the 2009 African Junior Championships she won gold in 
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both the 800 and 1,500 meters.
396
  Her 800 meter time set a junior national record, a meet 
record, and was the fastest time by a female athlete at that stage of the 2009 track 
season.
397
  Semenya's time qualified her for the 2009 World Championship in Berlin, 
Germany.
398
  She took gold at the World Championship and improved on her earlier 
time.
399
  Citing the drastic improvements in Semenya's times between the 2008 and 2009 
track season, the IAAF launched an investigation.  She was subjected to both drug and 
sex testing.
400
  In November 2009, the IAAF announced that Semenya was still 
undergoing testing to determine her eligibility.
401
  In March 2010, the IAAF announced 
that no further progress had been made in Semenya's case.
402
  Later in the same month, 
Semenya announced her intention to return to competition, she confirmed her 
commitment in June indicating that she was neither banned nor declared ineligible.
403
  In 
July 2010, the IAAF announced that Semenya was eligible to compete.
404
 
 The IAAF attempts to keep sex testing confidential and has not made any official 
announcement about Semenya's diagnosis.
405
  Reports indicated that Semenya likely had 
an intersex condition including the presence of internal testes and male reproductive 
organs.
406
  The length of the delay in announcing her ability to compete is also assumed 
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to correspond to increased levels of androgens and testosterone in her system.
407
  Her 
eligibility determination is linked either to treatment to reduce the advantage she gained 
from her intersex condition or a determination that she gained no advantage from the 
condition.
408
  Due in part to Semenya's case the IAAF launched further meetings to 
discuss sex testing practices and specifically to focus on the inclusion of athletes with 
hyperandrogenism.
409
 
 This is not an exhaustive list of female athletes who have either been identified as 
intersex or failed sex testing in some other fashion.  Part of the reason this list is 
incomplete is that the IAAF attempts to maintain the privacy of athletes, and test results 
are often not released.  Nonetheless, there are indications that during the 1972, 1976, and 
1984 Olympics nine athletes were determined to be ineligible as a result of sex testing.
410
  
During the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta eight athletes failed sex testing.
411
  Reports 
indicate that of the eight, seven had Androgen Insensitivity Disorder, and the eighth had 
5-alpha-reductase deficiency.
412
  All eight were allowed to compete.
413
 
 These vignettes illustrate the difficulty in making sex determinations for female 
athletes.  They also highlight the human element involved in these cases.  In the majority 
of cases the women who are sex tested and found to be intersex had no idea of their 
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condition.  The results were as much a surprise to them as they were to the officials 
conducting the tests.  Athletic competitions are concerned about the advantage that 
intersex athletes may have over other female athletes.  It is under the banner of fairness 
that sex testing policies are enacted.   
  
SECTION 2. 
The Assumptions Built into Female Athletics by Sex Testing and Why these 
Assumptions may be Inaccurate 
 Sex segregation in sport is based on the assumption that males have more athletic 
bodies.  The larger skeletal frame, muscle mass, lungs, and heart provide males with 
greater strength.  Greater strength results in a competitive advantage for male athletes.  
The views expressed by the Richards court and the various rules established by the IAAF 
and the IOC focus on eliminating this advantage.  The inherent assumption in this view is 
that the female athlete is disabled or disadvantage as compared to the male athlete and the 
transsexual and intersex athlete who possess elevated levels of androgens or some other 
advantage conferred by the presence of a male chromosome.  This does not discount the 
very real benefit of the expanded view of sex exemplified by the Richards court, nor the 
attempts by the IAAF and the IOC to be more inclusive over the years.  It rather forms 
the covert premise that underlies the rules that govern female sports.  In fact, there is no 
sex testing in male sports, because the assumption is that if a female were to participate 
she would possess no genetic advantage. 
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 But a straight comparison between the biological differences between males and 
females paints an incomplete picture of the dynamic of competitive sports.  First, it 
inherently ignores some of the advantages that female athletes may have over male 
athletes.  Second, it ignores the role that social and economic conditions play in the 
development of sports.   
A. The Biological Advantages of Female Athletes 
 The first major assumption that is ignored in sex testing's assumption that male 
athletes are biologically advantaged is that female athletes also possess biological 
advantages.  Female athletes’ burn fat at a higher ratio to carbohydrates than male 
athletes during endurance exercise.
414
  Burning more fat and less carbohydrates is a more 
efficient use of energy and provides a marked endurance advantage for female athletes.
415
  
Females also possess more uniformly distributed and efficient sweat glands; helping both 
with endurance and energy efficiency.
416
  While females tend to weigh less, they have a 
higher percentage of body fat.
417
  Female body fat tends to be distributed along the 
thighs, buttocks, and breasts, providing a heavier lower body and better center of 
gravity.
418
  Body fat distribution also makes women more buoyant and thus more 
efficient swimmers, in particular over long distances.
419
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 The composition of female bodies establishes some advantages in endurance 
capabilities.  The distribution of sweat glands, the more efficient use of fat and 
carbohydrates, and the distribution of fat make females more efficient endurance athletes. 
 In competitive ultra-marathon races females fatigue less quickly than males 
providing them with a distinct biological advantage.
420
  Ultra-marathon runners like 
Laura McDonough, Rhonda Provost, Pam Reed, and Ann Trason have on several 
occasions beaten similarly trained men in ultra-marathon races sometimes by hours.
421
 
Similarly, in the endurance event of ultra-cycling, female racers are competitive with 
male racers.  Seana Hogan, for example, has been competitive with male racers in various 
ultra-cycling events and on several occasions has beaten male competitors and set race 
records.
422
 
 Two women have won the Iditarod Trail Sled Dog Race.
423
  Libby Riddles won in 
1985 and Susan Butcher won four times between 1986 and 1990, including three 
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consecutive races.
424
  Butcher is one of only six people to win the Iditarod at least four 
times.
425
 
 In addition to endurance benefits, female athletes’ fat distribution makes them 
more efficient distance swimmers.
426
  Female athletes are routinely faster than male 
athletes in open water distance swims and their advantage increases as the distance 
increases.
427
 
 Other sports that segregate between female and male athletes focus on the 
differences in biology.  The quintessential example is artistic gymnastics.  The two 
competitions only share two events, the vault and the floor exercise.  Females 
additionally participate in balance beam and uneven bars.  Males compete in the pommel 
horse, high bar, parallel bars, and the still rings.  The male events place a greater 
emphasis on upper body strength, an area where biological factors benefit male athletes.  
The balance beam advantages a lower center of gravity and the nimbleness that 
corresponds to smaller body size.  The uneven bars are designed to require the athlete to 
travel from a lower to a higher bar.  The position of the bar and the need to travel 
between the two bars is advantageous to smaller athletes.   
 The differences in competitive achievement between male and female athletes 
may have less to do with the advantages of male athletes and more to do with having 
more sports that prize the athletic advantages that males possess.  If sports were instead 
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focused on the advantages of female athletes, female athletes would (and sometimes do) 
outperform males.  Fostering an environment that prizes female athletic advantages may 
even eliminate the need for sex comparison and reduce the tension over participation by 
transsexual or intersex athletes.   
B. The Impact of Social and Economic Conditions on Female Athletes 
 At the start of the modern Olympics in 1896 female athletes were excluded.  
Pierre de Coubertin, the founder of the modern Olympics, explained that female 
participation would be “impractical, uninteresting, unaesthetic, and incorrect.”428  Female 
athletes began limited participation at the 1900 Olympics in Paris, France.
429
  More 
significant participation by female athletes did not begin until the 1930s.
430
  During this 
early period female athletic participation was generally discouraged because sports were 
thought to be too violent.
431
  The medical community even indicated that participation 
was bad for reproductive health.
432
  Criticism of female participation in sports often 
centered on the erosion of femininity associated with athletic bodies.
433
 
 Participation by female athletes increased markedly in the United States with the 
passage of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.
434
  Title IX established, “No 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, 
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be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program 
or activity receiving federal financial assistance.”435  Title IX required schools to provide 
equal opportunities for athletic participation for both female and male athletes.  The result 
was a significant increase in the female athletic opportunities in schools from primary 
through post-secondary.  Despite the increased opportunities for female athletes, many of 
the social attitudes against female participation in sport have been slow to change.
436
 
 Title IX revolutionized opportunities for female participation in amateur sports, 
but there has yet to be similar opportunities for professional female athletes.  The only 
major team sport for professional female athletes in the United States is the Women’s 
National Basketball Association.  A four team National Professional Fastpitch Softball 
league does exist, but does not have significant coverage.
437
  The Women’s Professional 
Soccer League, the last operating female soccer association, cancelled the 2012 season.
438
  
Although the WNBA provides opportunities for female athletes to participate in 
professional basketball, the pay for WNBA players is significantly lower than their male 
counterparts.  The median salary for an NBA player is $2.5 million.
439
  The minimum 
salary for an NBA player is $473,604.
440
  The salary cap for a team of 11 WNBA players 
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is $878,000.
441
  There may be a myriad of reasons for the discrepancy that range from the 
profitability of the two leagues to their age (the NBA has been around for 50 more years).  
The point remains that there are fewer opportunities for female athletes and fewer 
incentives to participate even when those opportunities exist.  The incentive to put in the 
time and effort necessary to become a professional athlete is far higher for male athletes 
than for female athletes because they can obtain significantly higher salaries.   
 Although individual sports present a fairer picture for female athletes, 
discrepancies remain.  Female tennis did not provide equal payouts in major events until 
2007 when Wimbledon first provided equal prizes for female and male athletes.
442
  The 
PGA tour total prize money is $256 million, while the LPGA tour total prize money is 
$50 million.
443
 
 The social and economic conditions associated with female participation in 
athletics impacts the success of female athletes.  Female athletes have participated in 
organized sports for far fewer years than their male counterparts.  Female athletes have 
fewer opportunities to participate in professional sports.  Even when those opportunities 
exist, they are often paid less.  The result is fewer opportunities and fewer incentives for 
females who do participate in sports, to take the time and training to attain the same 
athletic performance of male athletes.  When younger females are presented with the 
opportunity to participate in sports they may not have the same level of desire to play at 
an elite level as males.  The social and economic realities of female sports may be in part 
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responsible for the relative underperformance of female athlete as compared to male 
athletes.   
 
SECTION 3. 
Conclusion 
 Sex testing in sports is primarily directed at ensuring fair play and eliminating any 
advantages that certain female athletes or male athletes masquerading as females may 
have in participating in female athletic events.  The push for fairness has resulted in two 
unforeseen consequences.  First, many transsexual and intersex athletes have been 
excluded from participating in female sports even though they were considered female in 
other aspects of life.  The sports community has taken steps to attempt to broaden 
participation by recognizing that some intersex and transsexual athletes may not possess 
advantages associated with male biology.  Nonetheless, certain intersex and transsexual 
athletes are still excluded because they are perceived to possess those advantages.  The 
persistent view about these advantage leads to the second consequence.  Female athletes 
under this mechanism are treated as disadvantaged or less-than male athletes.  This view 
is problematic for two reasons: (1) female athletes do have some physical advantages 
over male athletes, but most sports prize male athletic ability, and (2) social and 
economic conditions have created decades of advantages for male athletes that are not 
present for female athletes.  The presence of transsexual and intersex athletes highlights 
these two issues and further illustrates the problems with perceptions of sex as fixed and 
divided. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
CONSIDERATIONS IN ASSIGNING SEX TO INTERSEX CHILDREN 
 When a child is born, it is generally assigned to one of two sexes: male or female.  
Sex designation is required and monitored by the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services through the Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s National 
Center for Health Statistics.  The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) collects 
statistics pertinent to the health and wellbeing of all people under United States 
jurisdiction.  In the United States, the legal authority for registering vital statistics, 
including birth certificates, “resides individually with the 50 States, two cities 
(Washington, DC, and New York City), and five territories (Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands).”444  To ensure that vital statistics are properly maintained and consistent the 
NCHS coordinates collection with state agencies.  “Since the inception of a national vital 
statistics system, the states and the federal government have worked together 
cooperatively to promote standards and consistency among state vital statistics 
systems.”445  To this end, the NCHS produces standard birth certificates as “the principal 
means of promoting uniformity in the data collected by the states.”446  United States birth 
certificates provide three designations: male, female, or not yet determined.  If a child's 
sex is designated not yet determined, the hospital is instructed that the "[i]tem must be 
completed.  If the record is filled with an N code [not yet determined], send the record to 
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NCHS but query the hospital until a determination of the infant's sex is made.  Send the 
updated record to NCHS with the updated file."
447
 
Sex designation is made at birth primarily for statistical purposes, but also 
because traditionally this is when a child's sex is identified.  Sex statistics are used in 
making pertinent medical, social, and economic decisions.  It is with this information that 
everything from stratification and wage disparities to sex-differentiated disease 
trajectories can be identified and tracked.  Delay in identifying a child's sex is 
discouraged both for logistical reasons and because research shows that genital 
reconstruction is the least biologically traumatizing when done prior to age one.
448
   
 The majority of children are designated as either male or female at birth.  But, an 
estimated 1.7% to 4% of children are born intersex.
449
  Intersex is a term referring to a 
wide variety of individuals who are not easily identifiable as either male or female at 
birth, including those who have chromosomal abnormalities (such as Klinefelter's 
syndrome
450
) or ambiguous genitalia.
451
  Given the social desire to categorize individuals 
as either male or female, various policies and approaches have been pursued with the 
goal of placing an intersex person into either the female or male category.   
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 In this Chapter explores various approaches to categorizing intersex children as 
either male or female.  I also explore the way each of these approaches reifies sex 
dimorphism and the relationship between sex and gender. 
 
SECTION 1. 
The Need for Perinatal Sex Identification 
 Maintaining statistics on sex can be important for addressing sex linked health 
issues and for tracking sex-based discrimination.  Statistical information about sex is 
important for effective health intervention when there are differences between the sexes 
in the manifestation of a disease and its treatment.  Heart disease is one often-cited health 
difference between females and males.  "The exclusion of females from studies on heart 
disease is noted as one of the reasons heart disease is often misunderstood for female 
patients.  Until recently, women have been under-represented in many studies that have 
set the standard for detection and treatment of heart disease.  In addition, women with 
heart disease may have different symptoms than men, and different diagnostic tests may 
be less accurate in women."
452
  The National Institutes of Health (NIH) Women's Health 
Initiative was launched because of the general underrepresentation of females in health 
studies and with the goal of providing better and more accurate treatment for females.
453
  
A wide variety of theories exist about the differences in heart disease between the sexes 
including differences in symptoms and physical characteristics of the cardiovascular 
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system.
454
  Determining sex is important for maintaining statistics on health differences 
between males and females, ensuring that there is equal representation in health studies 
and ensuring for adequate care when sex differences matter.     
 Sex identification is also important for monitoring and diagnosing sex-linked 
genetic disorders.  Some genetic disorders are linked to the X chromosome but are 
recessive, so they only manifest in males.  "Examples of such disorders include 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy and Becker muscular dystrophy (both of which are 
neuromuscular disorders), fragile X syndrome (a type of mental retardation), and some 
types of leukodystrophy (a group of disorders that affect the central nervous system)."
455
  
Identifying the sex of the child may lead to faster and more accurate diagnosis of male 
children and avoid unnecessary testing of female children.   
 In considering sex discrimination, trends must be identified.  Such trends can only 
be identified among sex groups, because of sex classification.  Without having a pool of 
people designated as male and a separate group designated female, disparate treatments, 
patterns, and practices could not be addressed.  A claim of discrimination may be 
supported by demonstrating disparate treatment or a pattern or practice of 
discrimination.
456
  A disparate treatment claim cannot be based on statistical differences 
in treatment between females and males but statistical evidence of an imbalance in 
treatment may help to establish discriminatory intent.
457
  A pattern and practice claim, on 
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the other hand, can be supported by demonstrating statistical imbalance.
458
  In a pattern or 
practice claim "the evidence establishes that the discriminatory actions were the 
defendant's regular practice, rather than an isolated instance."
459
  A pattern or practice 
claim requires statistical support to demonstrate that discrimination is not isolated or 
motivated by other factors.  "A 'pattern or practice' means that the defendant has a policy 
of discriminating, even if the policy is not always followed."
460
  Gross statistical markers 
of discrimination may be sufficient on their own to demonstrate that discrimination has 
occurred on its face.
461
  To capture whether sex based differences impact employment 
opportunities or pay, a determination of sex and aggregation of the distinctions in 
treatment on the basis of sex is necessary. 
 Finally, our seemingly intractable link between sex and gender makes early 
identification of sex important to a child's psychosocial development.  Development of 
gender identity begins before age three.
462
  Children early on begin the process of 
distinguishing genders.  "By the age of 2 1/2 or 3 years, most children can answer 
correctly the question 'Are you a boy or a girl?' but it is not until several years later that 
children attain gender constancy, that is, understand that their sex remains invariant 
across time and changes in surface appearance (e.g., hair length)."
463
  The development of 
a gender identity steadily progresses through early and middle childhood.  "It is apparent 
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that by middle childhood children have developed fairly stable conceptions of (a) the 
degree to which they typify their gender category, (b) their contentedness with their 
gender assignment, (c) whether they are free to explore cross-sex options or are 
compelled to conform to gender stereotypes, and (d) whether their own sex is superior to 
the other."
464
 
 The development of gender identity is a critical component in psychosocial 
development.  "These dimensions of gender identity are not strongly related to one 
another, yet all relate to psychosocial adjustment."
465
  Once children are aware of their 
gender, they can still borrow from the opposite sex and can more competently relate 
psychosocially to their peers, since they have a perspective from which to relate.  In fact, 
knowledge of a gender identity appears important for self-identity but gender identity 
does not lead to total gender role adherence.  "It indicates that self-perceptions of gender 
typicality do not necessarily reflect an unhealthy gender-role straight jacket that 
undermines well-being; rather, they appear to contribute positively and directly to a 
healthy sense of self."
466
   
 Pressure to adhere completely to gender lines may be negative.  "Clearly, it is felt 
pressure for gender conformity, not a perception of the self as gender typical, that is 
harmful."
467
  Gender identity can provide a point of reference for children in developing 
an identity.  Harm occurs when the child no longer has the ability to explore his/her 
gender identity and is instead pressured or coerced by parents or others to act in a 
particular gendered manner.  "Thus, children's adjustment is optimized when they (a) are 
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secure in their conceptions of themselves as typical members of their sex yet (b) feel free 
to explore cross-sex options when they so desire."
468
  Some researchers thus conclude 
that allowing children to form a gender identity is positive as long as the child is given 
some flexibility in adhering to that identity.  "Parents and educators might strive to instill 
in children a sense that they are free to investigate other-sex options, but these adults 
should also be respectful of children's need to feel that they are typical and adequate 
members of their own gender."
469
  Failing to select a sex, and consequently denying 
gender identity formation, may result in psychosocial adjustment issues.      
 One highly publicized attempt at separating sex and gender is the case of Sasha.
470
  
Sasha was born a biological boy and not intersex.
471
  Nonetheless, Sasha's parents 
decided they did not want to raise him with a gender until they were forced to when he 
entered school at five years-old.
472
  Before this period Sasha's parents did not use 
gendered pronouns.
473
  They did not reveal their child's sex to others, including other 
family members.
474
  Sasha's parents felt that gendering him would preclude him from 
having more meaningful interactions and force him into materialized, socially 
constructed versions of his gender.
475
 
 The intertwined dimorphism of sex and gender is often difficult to tease out from 
our socialized interaction.  Sasha's parents' actions betray their own views of gender and 
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their desire to socialize Sasha under their assumptions of proper gender roles.  Sasha was 
allowed to wear any clothing he wanted, "except hyper masculine clothing like shirts 
with skulls on them."
476
  Sasha was also not allowed to play with Barbie "because yuck, 
she's horrible."
477
  His parents also make him wear a girl's blouse to school with his 
uniform but not because he chooses to dress that way but instead because of his parent's 
gender predilections.
478
  "I don't think I'd do it if I thought it was going to make him 
unhappy, but at the moment he's not really bothered either way. We haven't had any 
difficult scenarios yet."
479
  Sasha's case illustrates the difficulty in living a life devoid of 
gender, in a world where gender roles still matter.  The decision to raise Sasha as 
genderless also worked against the gender identity he was forming as part of his self-
identity.  Sasha was not allowed to wear the clothing he desired.  Instead those decisions 
were made for him.  He was not allowed to wear certain masculine clothing and was 
forced to wear feminine clothing.  These steps clearly denied Sasha his self-identity.  The 
form of pressure Sasha experienced was not conformity to the aligned sex and gender, 
but it was pressure nonetheless, specifically pressure not to align his sex and gender.  
 Denying the existence of gender identity is difficult in a world that is gendered.  
Sasha's parents illustrate the difficulty in raising a child androgynously when identity and 
socialization are in part gender linked.  A more effective manner of challenging gender 
identity and its link to sex is to allow for gender identity formation and then permitting 
and encouraging opposite sex behavior or identity when it is desired.  Permitting children 
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to form identities that move beyond their initial gender identity is more constructive than 
establishing pressure against the current gender norms.   
 Notably, if, as a society, we were able to decouple sex and gender, sex 
identification at birth would become less significant.  Although early sex identification 
would continue to have health benefits, the statistical needs could be reduced and the 
psychosocial needs might be diminished. 
 
SECTION 2. 
Perinatal Sex Assignment by Physical Attributes  
 Sex identification is most pressing with children who are born with ambiguous 
genitalia.  The first major wave of treatment for children born with ambiguous genitalia 
involved surgical intervention at or near birth.
480
  At this time, surgical intervention was 
the best practice; this was not challenged until the early 1990s.
481
  Under this model, 
surgical intervention was often dictated by the proximity of the genitalia to the norm.
482
  
Perceptions of this norm are generally based on the size of clitoris/penis and the desire 
for alteration to move the genitalia to fit as closely within the norm as possible.
483
 
 The size of the external genitalia holds some importance.  It impacts the ability to 
engage in penetrative sex after puberty.
484
  Another factor in the analysis is the function 
                                                 
480
   Elizabeth Weil, What if It’s (Sort of) a Boy and (Sort of) a Girl?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2006 
(Magazine), at 48; 
481
   Intersex Society of North America, What's the history behind the intersex rights movement?, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/history 
482
   Weil, supra note 479.  
483
   Id. Some studies indicated that a clitoris ought not be larger than 0.9 centimeters at birth.  Suzanne 
J. Kessler, Lessons from the Intersexed, (1998).  The desired outcome for a male is to have a penis that will 
be at least 1 inch at the time of puberty.  Id. 
484
   Weil, supra note 479. 
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of the genitalia for urinating.
485
  For a male, surgical intervention may be immediately 
pursued when the urinary tract or the genitalia do not permit standing while urinating.
486
  
Depending on the size and shape of the external genitalia, a physician would alter the 
genitalia and designate the child as either male or female.
487
  Because a Vaginoplasty is 
often seen as an easier and more accurate surgery, many children born with ambiguous 
genitalia are designated female and are surgically altered to have more normal female 
genitalia.
488
  These operations first began before there was wide recognition of intersex 
children and the operation was conducted with or without the consent of the parents.  
Intervention was seen as prudent by many surgeons to allow a child to live as either a 
male or female.  Surgical intervention at an early age was deemed to limit physical 
trauma caused by surgery, as well as psycho-social inconsistencies.
489
 
 When greater acknowledgement of intersex children began in the 1950s, 
psychologist John Money moved to the forefront in establishing a medical framework for 
gender development and intersex treatment.
490
  Money recommended early intervention 
in assigning sex.
491
  He indicated that surgeons, with the consent of parents, ought to 
                                                 
485
   Kristin Zeiler & Anette Wickström, Why Do ‘We’ Perform Surgery on Newborn Intersexed 
Children?: The Parental Experience of Having a Child with Intersex Anatomies, 10 FEMINIST THEORY 359, 
365 (2009).   
486
   Id. 
487
   Weil, supra note 479.  
488
   John Money, Sex Assignment in Anatomically Intersexed Infants, in HUMAN SEXUALITY: A HEALTH 
PRACTITIONER’S TEXT, 136-49 (Richard Green ed., 2nd ed. 1979). 
489
   Surgical intervention between 6 and 12 months is ideal because it reduces the potential for 
psychological and social issues such as aggressive or regressive behavior, night terrors, and anxiety.  
American Academy. of Pediatrics,  supra note 448, at 590.  
490
   Milton Diamond, Sex, Gender, and Identity over the Years: A Changing Perspective, 13 CHILD & 
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 591, 591 (2004).   
491
   John Money, Sex assignment in Anatomically Intersexed Infants, in Human Sexuality: A Health 
Practitioner’s Text, 136-49 (Richard Green ed., 2nd ed. 1979). 
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make a decision as early as possible to intervene and surgically assign a sex at or near 
birth.
492
 
 Money had several reasons for arriving at these conclusions.  First, Money 
contended that surgical intervention was necessary to allow a child to obtain gender 
normalcy.
493
  The goal was to provide a clearly "sexed individual" and avoid issues with 
sex ambiguity.
494
  Money argued that gender was more important than sex in healthy 
psychological interactions.
495
  Money felt that parents would bond more quickly and 
effectively with a child that had a defined sex and gender.
496
  In part, Money based his 
theory on the view that parents had a hard time bonding with a child that has a congenital 
defect.
497
  In addition, Money theorized that a strong gender identity was necessary for 
healthy psychological development because it allowed for the child to identify with 
others and explore self-identity.
498
  Second, Money contended that gender was socially 
constructed (not hormonally dependent) and that even surgical alteration of a biological 
male or female to make him or her a member of the opposite sex could be successful as 
long as there was sufficient gender normalizing.
499
  Third, Money contended that early 
intervention facilitated parent child bonding.
500
  Money argued that bonding was more 
                                                 
492
   Id. 
493
   Id. 
494
   Id. 
495
   John Money & Anke A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman, Boy & Girl: Gender Identity from Conception 
to Maturity, (1996).  
496
   Id. 
497
   American Academy of Pediatrics, supra note 488, at 590. 
498
   Money & Ehrhardt, supra note 50; see also Kenneth I. Glassberg, Editorial, Gender Identity and 
the Pediatric Urologist, 161 J. UROLOGY 1308, 1308–09 (1999).   
499
   Money, supra note 46.   
500
   Id. 
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effective when parents have a gender identity to socialize toward.
501
  Thus, Money 
argued that a doctor and parent ought to make a decision early on about the preferred sex 
of the child, conduct an operation to conform the child to that sex, and socialize the child 
in the gender aligned with the selected sex immediately.
502
 
 Under this form of treatment, parents are frequently instructed not to reveal 
intervention or the intersex status to the child.
503
  The goal of aligning the child's sex and 
gender is best met by nondisclosure because "any doubt may undermine development of 
a gender identity concordant with the assigned sex of rearing."
504
 
 Early intervention alone is not always sufficient; often times, even those with 
early intervention often require further operations or treatment to normalize sex.
505
  As 
the body moves toward and through puberty, various interventions may be necessary to 
maintain the assigned sex.
506
  These interventions may include hormone therapy and 
other operations to alter physical appearance, such as breast reduction or augmentation.  
Even with these interventions, some doctors continue to counsel against revealing the 
child's sex ambiguity and the earlier intervention because the child may not have the 
cognitive or psychosocial capabilities to fully comprehend his/her situation.
507
  A 
                                                 
501
   Id. 
502
   Id. 
503
   Id. 
504
   Bruce E. Wilson & William G. Reiner, Management of Intersex: A Shifting Paradigm, 9 J. 
CLINICAL ETHICS 360, 362 (1998). 
505
   See e.g., Sarah M. Creighton et al., Objective Cosmetic and Anatomical Outcomes at Adolescence 
of Feminising Surgery for Ambiguous Genitalia Done in Childhood, 358 LANCET 124, 124(2001). 
506
   Id. 
507
  See e.g., American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Pediatrics AIDS. Disclosure of Illness 
Status to Children and Adolescents with HIV Infection, 103 PEDIATRICS 164, 164-66 (1999).  
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recommendation for gradual disclosure with increasing levels of sophistication is 
recommended to parallel cognitive and psychosocial development.
508
   
 The success of early intervention is not clear.  There are few studies examining 
the success of socialization and early intervention in the gender and sex identity health of 
children.  In addition, early intervention based on morphological aspects of the genitalia 
may lead to functional issues as the child grows and enters puberty.  These issues include, 
but are not limited to, differences between the appearance of the genitalia and their 
reproductive capacity
509
  and the impacts of hormone increases at puberty on other 
aspects of physical appearance.
510
 
 Further complicating the early intervention socialization model advocated by 
Money was the 1997 revelation of the failed socialization of David Reimer.
511
  Reimer, 
referred to in medical literature as John, suffered a severe injury to his genitalia as an 
infant.
512
  Reimer's genitalia was altered because doctors determined that the construction 
of female genitalia would be more successful.
513
  Reimer was then raised as a girl.
514
 
Money traced Reimer's progress.
515
  When Reimer turned 10 and hit puberty, Money 
pronounced Reimer's intervention a success.
516
  But later, follow up by journalists and 
                                                 
508
   John Money, Sex Errors of the Body and Related Syndromes: A Guide to Counseling Children, 
Adolescents, and Their Families, (2nd ed., 1994). 
509
   For example, in John Money's intervention with David Reimer, David was operated to make his 
genitalia female but he still had the ability to reproduce as a male.  After the surgical intervention he no 
longer could reproduce.  Diamond, supra note 489.  
510
   Puberty results in the release of hormones that alter physical appearance.  A child assigned a sex 
opposite of the sex hormones that are released at puberty could see physical changes such as the 
development of breast tissue or facial hair growth that does not align with their assigned sex.   
511
   Diamond, supra note 489, at 595.  
512
   Id. 
513
   Id. 
514
   Id. 
515
   Id. at 560. 
516
   Id. 
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scholars, revealed that Reimer's intervention was unsuccessful.
517
  At 16, Reimer decided 
to live as a man.
518
  He explained that he had felt he was a man for years and even had 
suicidal ideations resulting from these thoughts.
519
 
 Several studies report some number of early intervention patients rejecting their 
assigned sex.
520
  Speculation about the cause of rejection varies.  Some researchers 
contend that there is a neurobiological connection to gender identity.
521
  Other 
researchers contended that certain intersex conditions are prone to later rejection
522
 while 
others do not lead to rejection.
523
 
 Money's early intervention model is notable because, while he acknowledges that 
gender is socially conditioned, he contends that sex can be altered as long as the 
conditioned gender is aligned with that sex.
524
  This view moves away from the theory 
that gender is an innate result of the hormones and other biological conditions of sex.  
Nonetheless, Money's early intervention model pre-supposes the need for sex and gender 
to be aligned and dimorphic for a person to live a healthy well-adjusted life.  Money 
                                                 
517
   Id. 
518
   Id. 
519
   Id. 
520
   See e.g., Morgan Holmes, Rethinking the Meaning and Management of Intersexuality, 5 
SEXUALITIES 159, 169–70, 172 (2002). 
521
   Paula Jean Manners, Gender Identity Disorder in Adolescence: A Review of the Literature, 14 
CHILD & ADOLESCENT MENTAL HEALTH 62, 62–68 (2009).  
522
   Sheri A. Berenbaum, Management of Children with Intersex Conditions: Psychological and 
Methodological Perspectives, 19 GROWTH, GENETICS, & HORMONES 1, 1 (2003).   
523
   Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS 
e488, e491 (2006) ("More than 90% of patients with 46,XX CAH and all patients with 46,XY CAIS 
assigned female in infancy identify as females." Meanwhile, "Approximately 60% of 5-α-reductase 
(5αRD2)-deficient patients assigned female in infancy and virilizing at puberty (and all assigned male) live 
as males.")   
524
   See e.g., John Money & Patricia Tucker, Sexual Signatures on Being a Man or a Woman, (1975). 
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contended that children are born psychosexually neutral.
525
  The physical appearance of a 
child can be altered and then the gender is determined by rearing.  The need to align sex 
and gender is desirable for the child to feel normal.
526
 
  The Money model does not move away from the view that sex and gender 
are connected and dimorphic.  Instead Money and others contend that gender is more 
important and sex can be made to align with gender.   
 
SECTION 3. 
The Consensus Statement on the Management of Intersex Disorders 
 In 2006 a major review of medical intervention on intersex children was 
conducted by the Lawson Wilkins Pediatric Endocrine Society and the European Society 
for Pediatric Endocrinology.
527
  The review was prompted by, "progress in diagnosis, 
surgical techniques, understanding psychosocial issues, and recognizing and accepting 
the place of patient advocacy."
528
  Based on research conducted by 50 international 
experts including a series of literature reviews and myriad of questionnaires and 
investigations, a protocol for intervention was released called The Consensus Statement 
on the Management of Intersex Disorders (Consensus Statement).
529
  The new protocol 
advances a more holistic approach to intervention, including examining social issues, 
                                                 
525
 Diamond, supra note 489, 595-96.  
526
 Id. 
527
 Lee et al., supra note 520, at e488.   
528
 Id. 
529
   Id.  Among other conclusions, the group determined that there is controversy surrounding the use 
of the term "intersex" and instead advocated for the use of “disorders of sex development.”  The 
controversy surrounded the term being "perceived as potentially pejorative by patients" and resulting in 
confusion among practitioners and parents. Given the continued pervasive use of the term "intersex" in the 
literature and the use of the term by those who are intersex, deference is given to that term in this 
dissertation.   
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genital appearance, reproductive function, sexual sensitivity, and psychology, among 
others.
530
  The Consensus Statement advocates a five step model to intervention.
531
 
 First, "gender assignment must be avoided before expert evaluation in 
newborns."
532
  Expert evaluation requires team intervention: "Ideally, the team includes 
pediatric subspecialists in endocrinology, surgery, and/or urology, 
psychology/psychiatry, gynecology, genetics, neonatology, and, if available, social work, 
nursing, and medical ethics."
533
  The first step rejects surgical intervention on the basis of 
a physician's assessment of the physical genitalia alone because it was an inadequate 
measure of the child's health and best interests.
534
  It also rejects physician intervention at 
the behest of parents.
535
  Instead, the protocol requires expert evaluation of all aspects of 
the child's sex.
536
  The evaluation includes identification of the intersex condition, 
assessment of the potential reproductive health and function of the child, the potential 
sexual health of the child, and psychological consequences of intervention, among other 
things.
537
   This approach was intended to be an improvement over previous 
methodologies that either examined too few dimensions of sex in making an assessment 
to assign sex or gave too much deference to the parent's desire for an immediate medical 
resolution. 
 Second, "evaluation and long-term management must be performed at a center 
with an experienced multidisciplinary team."
538
  A multidisciplinary team can help 
address all of the medical, psychological, and social issues a child and his/her parents 
                                                 
530
 Id. e490. 
531
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533
 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
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 Id. 
538
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may face.
539
 The second step further emphasizes the need to examine potential issues for 
an intersex child on the various aspects that may impact health in both the short- and 
long- term.  In addition, the second step requires long-term involvement.  Research has 
indicated that although early intervention was often predicated on the emergency of a 
child being intersex and the psychological trauma of sex ambiguity, little continued 
assistance or monitoring was provided to the parent or the child.
540
  In part, the failure to 
provide continued assistance and intervention was based on the desire to establish the 
normalcy of the child's assigned sex and gender.
541
  Continued medical intervention 
would imply to the child that there was something wrong with him/her and doctors 
wanted to avoid sending that message.
542
  Additionally, many doctors believed that 
surgical intervention was sufficient to resolve the medical crisis and further intervention 
was unnecessary.
543
  The new protocol rejects that view and instead requires continued 
intervention as vital for the physical and psychological health of the child and for the 
management of the parents' relationship with the child.
544
  The continued presence of a 
medical team helps ensure that both parent and child have a healthy and effective 
approach to the child’s status as intersex.   
                                                 
539
 Id.; see also American Academy of Pediatrics, Council on Children with Disabilities, Care 
Coordination in the Medical Home: Integrating Health and Related Systems of Care for Children with 
Special Health Care Needs, 116 PEDIATRICS1238, 1238-1244 (2005). 
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 Peter A. Lee, A Perspective on the Approach to the Intersex Child Born with Genital Ambiguity, 17 
J. PEDIATRIC ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM133, 133-40 (2004); Suzanne Cashman et al., 
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Teams, 18 J. INTERPROFESSIONAL CARE183, 183-96 (2004). 
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 Diamond, supra note 489, 595-96. 
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544
 Lee et al., supra note 520, at e490.   
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 Third, "all individuals should receive a gender assignment."
545
  The protocol does 
not require immediate intervention at or near birth, although it encourages intervention as 
early as possible.  The Consensus Statement recommends early intervention because 
“[i]nitial gender uncertainty is unsettling and stressful for families.”546  Children are also 
less traumatized when surgical intervention occurs early.
547
  In addition, early 
intervention is often necessary for healthy physical development.
548
  Even if early 
surgical intervention is avoided, the new protocol strongly encourages gender 
assignment.  The need for gender assignment is based on a desire to provide healthy 
psychological development both in bonding with parents and socializing with others.
549
  
The protocol ascribes significant psychological benefit to gender assignment, even if 
surgical intervention is postponed.
550
  The protocol also presents probability estimates on 
the success of gender assignment based on the intersex condition.
551
  Thus, while it 
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 Id.; see American Academy of Pediatrics, Section on Urology, Timing of Elective Surgery on the 
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Surgery and Anesthesia, 97PEDIATRICS 590, 590-94 (1996).   
548
 Lee et al., at e491-92.  For example, the Consensus Statement argues that separation of the urethra 
and vagina in newborns is medically appropriate because “the beneficial effects of estrogen on tissue in 
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550
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develops early.  “Gender identity development begins before the age of 3 years, but the earliest age at 
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sex.  Id. at e492.  The Consensus Statement indicates that if the view is persistent than a specialist should 
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551
   For example, the Consensus Statements offers that, "More than 90% of patients with XX 
congenital adrenal hyperplasia and all patients with XY complete androgen insensitivity syndrome assigned 
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rejects emergency intervention and presents a more holistic approach to assignment than 
the model advocated by Money and other predecessors, it nonetheless continues to see 
the vital importance of early assignment of a gender role.     
 The final two steps place emphasis on the interrelationship between the child and 
the parents and the need to encourage dialogue and respect the views of the patient and 
his family.  Fourth, "open communication with patients and families is essential, and 
participation in decision-making is encouraged."
552
  Fifth, "patient and family concerns 
should be respected and addressed in strict confidence."
553
 
 The Consensus Statement and its protocol address advancements in understanding 
of intersex children and the various conditions that may result in a child being intersex.  
The Consensus Statement also takes a more holistic view and provides more options for 
the child and the parents.  Nonetheless, even under the new protocol emphasis is placed 
on maintaining coherence between gender and sex.  The goal remains closely aligning 
sex and gender to ensure healthy psychological development and social integration. 
 
SECTION 4. 
Delayed Gender Assignment Model 
 In response to concerns about sex identification, a new strategy has emerged.  
Recently, the approach has been to deny any need to assign sex during early childhood 
development and instead allow the child to make gender decisions as the child matures.  
                                                                                                                                                 
female in infancy identify as females."  Id. at e491.Given this evidence the Consensus Statement 
recommends raising children with either of these conditions as female. Id. 
552
 Id. at e490 
553
 Id. 
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Advocates of this model insist that children ought to be given the right to give informed 
consent about their sex assignment. 
 The Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) embraces many of the 
improvements in the treatment of intersex children under the Consensus Statement.
554
  
ISNA contends that, although the protocol indicated by the Consensus Statement is a step 
in the right direction, more emphasis ought to be placed on the decision of the child and 
that the child's consent is necessary for surgical intervention.
555
  Informed consent is 
advocated to preserve two interests: “bodily integrity and self-determination.”556   
 The informed consent model has been embraced by a series of scholars with 
varying approaches to the decisions as to when or if to designate a gender.  Some 
scholars advocate a child being raised with an intersex assignment,
557
 others advocate 
that a child should have a fluid assignment elected by the child,
558
 others advocate the 
child have no gender assignment until the child can make an informed decision about the 
gender assignment,
559
 still others advocate a legal mechanism for childhood 
intervention.
560
  Under all of these options the decision for surgical intervention is 
avoided until puberty, but no consensus about the appropriate approach until surgical 
intervention has emerged.   
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 Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and Medical Dilemma: Should 
Physicians Perform Sex Assignment on Infants with Ambiguous Genitalia?,7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 34 
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 The Intersex Society of North America, supra note 552.  
558
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and the Specter of Iatrogenic Harm to Children with Intersex Characteristics, 33 Am. J.L. & Med. 625, 
625-661 (2007).     
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 Beh & Diamond, supra note 554, at 34-63.   
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 Anne Tamar-Mattis, Exceptions to the Rule: Curing the Law’s Failure to Protect Intersex Infants, 
21 BERKELEY J. GENDER & L. & JUSTICE 59, 98-101 (2006).    
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  Another issue with a consent-based theory on sex and gender selection is that 
puberty may set in before a child has made a decision about the sex and gender he/she 
wants to live in.  Puberty normally sets in as early as seven for girls and nine for boys.
561
  
An eight or nine year old may still have difficulty making a decision about what sex and 
gender he/she would like to live in.  Some have advocated the use of puberty delaying 
medication to stop the onset of puberty until a child makes a decision.
562
  But, the use of 
puberty delaying drugs is controversial.  Many doctors believe that the use of these 
medications may have negative health implications for children.  The delay of puberty 
may impact healthy development and increase the likelihood of certain ailments 
including cancers.
563
  In addition, the fact that medical intervention is necessary for a 
child to be able to have time to select a sex and gender is indicative to some that the 
decision should be made through the holistic medical-based approach advocated by the 
Consensus Statement with an emphasis on earlier assignment and intervention.  Plus, it is 
unclear how long it may take for a child to be secure in making a decision about his/her 
sex and gender.  If eight is not old enough, why would twelve or fourteen be old enough?    
 Even under a system that embraces consent and advocates for later gender and sex 
assignment, the focus remains on aligning sex and gender.  The choice to delay puberty is 
based on the increased physical manifestations of sex.  The desire is to allow the child to 
remain in the more sex identity-neutral body that exists before puberty.  When puberty 
occurs, sex identity becomes more central and the congruence between sex and gender is 
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   Kimberley Zagoren, What are the Pediatric Side Effects of Lupron?, (Sept. 2, 2010) LiveStrong, 
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more relevant.  Thus, a consent-based model does little to challenge the dimorphic view 
of sex.  
 
SECTION 5. 
Conclusion 
 Birth certificates provide two options for a child's sex: male or female.  Intersex 
children with ambiguous genitalia are difficult to categorize.  Although models for 
categorizing intersex children have evolved and changed, they still embrace a dimorphic 
model.  Although early intervention is still favored, sex is not assigned based on 
morphology alone.  Nonetheless, the view that sex and gender must be aligned persists.  
Finally, there has been some advocacy for delaying sex and gender selection until a child 
can consent to medical intervention.  But even under this revised approach of leaving the 
decision to the child, the dimorphic model persists.     
 Two considerations should be made in determining policy on perinatal sex 
identification.  First, the biological needs of the child should be assessed.  Surgical 
intervention should occur as early as possible to allow for the child to have reproductive 
viability if possible.  But, the second and more significant policy demand is for proactive 
steps to be made to decouple sex and gender. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF SEX SELECTION AND A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ANTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 
Technological development provides cause for both hope and concern.  Hope 
arises from the promise of the technology resolving issues and alleviating suffering.  
Concern arises from negative externalities and ethical quandaries.  The more technology 
directly interacts with humans, the more hope and concern are produced.  Thus, human 
enhancement technology is an area of particular concern for many.   
Ethical debates about human enhancement technologies tend to vacillate between 
two poles.  There are those who are opposed to human enhancement technologies 
because they believe technological developments interfere with human nature (humans 
playing god) and lead to eugenics.
564
  This group generally sees human technological 
advancement as either therapeutic or enhancing.  Therapy cures disease and restores 
health; enhancements alter human nature.  They believe that therapy should be pursued 
and enhancement should be legislated or discouraged.   
On the other end of the spectrum are technological libertarians who insist that 
individuals have freedom over their own bodies and can choose any modification.
565
  
Technological libertarians contend that restrictions on human enhancement deny 
individual liberty, and thus they advocate against legislation.  “For some, nanotechnology 
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   See e.g., The President’s Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, (2003); Francis Fukuyama, Our 
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   See e.g., Ronald Bailey, Liberation Biology: The Scientific and Moral Case for the Biotech 
Revolution (2005); James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg, (2004).    
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holds the promise of making us superhuman; for others, it offers a darker path toward 
becoming Frankenstein’s monster.”566     
Recently, the ethical debate over human enhancement has also seen a middle 
ground, where attempts are made to merge these theories, into a more nuanced and 
holistic approach to human enhancement technologies.  One such approach is 
anticipatory governance.   
Anticipatory governance involves engaging in a multidisciplinary approach and 
developing capacity to address issues before they become concerns.
567
  The goal is not to 
limit development or application, but to understand potential consequences and address 
the issues that underlie them.
568
  Anticipatory governance does not necessarily require 
government action but may manifest in a wide variety of actions including, “the 
implementation of licenses and other kinds of restrictions, the use of liability and 
indemnification, the application of intellectual property rights, the execution of treaties, 
the development of standards, testing regimes, and codes of conduct, and public action in 
various forms ranging from education to protest.”569  
The approach focuses on developing a "broad-based capacity extended through 
society that can act on a variety of inputs to manage emerging . . . technologies while 
such management is still possible."
570
  To obtain this goal requires multidisciplinary 
examination of issues from the perspective of various people who may be impacted by 
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these technologies.  "Anticipatory governance comprises the ability of a variety of lay 
and expert stakeholders, both individually and through an array of feedback mechanisms, 
to collectively imagine, critique, and thereby shape the issues presented by emerging 
technologies before they become reified in particular ways."
571
  The approach requires 
more interaction between scientists and social scientists in examining the ethical, social, 
and political consequences of technological advancement.  "Competent social scientists 
should work hand-in-hand with natural scientists, so that problems may be solved as they 
arise, and so that many of them may not arise in the first instance."
572
   
The goal of these interactions is to better understand issues and how to address 
them before they arise or when they arise.  "Anticipatory governance implies that 
effective action is based on more than sound analytical capacities and relevant empirical 
knowledge: It also emerges out of a distributed collection of social and epistemological 
capacities."
 573
  Functionally, anticipatory governance involves "describing and analyzing 
plausible, intended and potentially unintended outcomes of an implications associated 
with research and its development, be these economic, social, environmental or 
otherwise. . . to surface issues and explore possible impacts and implications that may 
otherwise remain uncovered and little discussed."
574
  
The need for an anticipatory governance frame and multidisciplinary approach is 
seen as important for governing development.  The National Science Foundation (NSF) 
acknowledges the need to examine the societal implications of advancing technologies.  
                                                 
571
   Id. at 992-93 
572
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409, 413 (1975).   
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   Richard Owen et al., Responsible Innovation: Managing the Responsible Emergence of Science 
and Innovation in Society, 1 (2013).  
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The NSF has noted that "[e]xamining the ethical and other social implications of these 
societal interactions is necessary, in order to understand their scope and influence and to 
anticipate and respond effectively to them."
575
  The NSF has also recognized a need for a 
"long-term vision for addressing societal, ethical, environmental and educational 
concerns" surrounding emerging technologies.
576
   
Despite the potential benefits of the anticipatory governance approach, critics 
remain.  Critics of anticipatory governance often argue that it is speculative ethics.
577
  
The approach is criticized for imagining problems and then imagining approaches to 
solve those problems.  It is seen as engaging in science fiction rather than engaging in 
ethical, social, political, and scientific concerns that are contemporary.  
In this Chapter, I will use the anticipatory framework to examine sex selection 
practices.  These practices are historical, contemporary, and prospective.  By examining 
an issue that is not merely speculative through the anticipatory governance framework it 
is my hope to both illuminate why the approach is helpful and to more fully understand 
the issue of sex selection itself.  
Sex selection presents profound ethical controversy revolving around existing 
technologies and developing technologies.  I will examine sex selection and various 
ethical approaches to sex selection before offering an anticipatory governance framework 
grounded in sex equality to address some of these ethical issues.   
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SECTION 1. 
Sex Selection 
 Selecting the sex of a child is not necessarily a new concept.  Sex selective 
abortion has been a practice in some countries for many years.  When a society prizes one 
sex over another, having a child of the preferred sex may provide significant benefits.  
Scientific and technological improvements permit parents to know the sex of the fetus 
earlier in developmental stages.  Although scientific improvements have enabled sex 
selection to occur in early fetal stages, sex selection of infants has been practiced since 
pre-history.   
 Some prehistoric societies engaged in infanticide as a method of population 
control.  Infanticide was often committed to ensure that the (reduced) population could be 
fed and defended.  Infanticide often focused on the weaker infants who were thought to 
be a particular liability to the group.  "Infanticide has been practiced on every continent 
and by people on every level of cultural complexity, from hunter gatherers to high 
civilizations, including our own ancestors.  Rather than being an exception, then, it has 
been the rule."
578
Rates of infanticide for this time are estimated to be between 15% and 
50% of all live births.
579
  Most infanticides were committed by simple exposure or refusal 
to provide nourishment.
580
  The rates of infanticide are thought to have been higher for 
females than for males
581
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 The move from hunter-gatherer and prehistoric societies to agrarian societies 
reduced infanticide rates in most cultures.  But, the practice persisted across many 
cultures, dictated primarily by strains on resources.  As societies continued to modernize, 
infanticide rates plummeted and nearly disappeared.  
 Sex-selective abortion practices replaced infanticide in certain cultures.  Sex-
selective abortion is in part possible because of prenatal testing.   
 Traditional techniques for determining sex involve ultrasonography, either 
transvaginally or transabdominally, which is used to identify phenotypic sex markers.
582
  
Ultrasounds can be performed between 65 and 69 days from fertilization (week 12 of 
gestational age).
583
  Early stage testing results in sex identification in 90% of cases, with 
a 75% rate of accuracy.
584
  Ultrasounds performed 70 days from fertilization (at week 13 
of gestational age) are nearly 100% accurate in identifying sex.
585
 
 Sex identification techniques have improved, and there are now DNA tests 
available that can identify sex much earlier in gestation and with greater accuracy.
586
  
DNA analysis conducted after the seventh week of pregnancy is accurate 98.6% of the 
time when the test identifies a sex.
587
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 The presence of sex-selective abortion is highly correlated with large socio-
economic stratification, marked by severe poverty and strongly paternalistic cultures.
588
  
These forces are often most pronounced in East and South Asia.
589
  The preference for 
male children in certain cultures is based on the advantages conferred by maleness.
590
  In 
these cultures males are wage earners.
591
  When they are married, they hold the 
expectation of taking care of their parents.
592
  They are heirs not only to the family name 
but to any accumulated wealth.
593
  In cultures with a dowry system, parents of female 
children are additionally burdened by having to provide extra money or goods when their 
daughter is married.
594
  Male children are thus assets, and female children are burdens.
595
  
The asset and burden system is exacerbated when limits are placed on the number of 
children that a family can sustain, either through policy (such as China's One Child 
Policy) or through circumstances (such as extreme poverty and the resulting inability to 
feed all children).   
 Sex-selective abortion is less about the sex of the child and more about gender 
roles.  The stricter the adherence to traditional gender roles the more likely sex-selective 
abortion is to occur.  Sex matters only in as much as it is bound to gender.  Males are 
assets because they are wage earners, heirs, and heads of family.  Females are burdens 
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because they may require dowries, cannot hold property, and are additional mouths to 
feed.  But these characteristics are not innately tied to sex but are the conditions of the 
society's construction of gender and the tie of gender to sex.     
 While widespread sex-selective abortion is primarily based on issues of asset vs. 
burden, sex-selective abortion may also be done for medical reasons.  Sex selection may 
be related to X chromosome linked recessive disorders.
596
  Certain disorders are linked to 
genetic abnormalities in the X chromosome.
597
  These disorders will only manifest in 
male children.
598
  Female children can only be carriers.
599
  Mothers who are carriers may 
want to select female children to avoid passing the X chromosome linked recessive 
disorder to a male child.   
 But, sex selection is not limited to abortion.  Sex selection can also occur by 
manipulating fertilization or gestation.       
 In the 1970s Dr. Ronald J. Ericsson developed a method for sorting sperm to 
select for sex.
600
  Sperm either contain an X chromosome or a Y chromosome.
601
  The 
Ericsson method separates X chromosome and Y chromosome sperm by passing them 
through human serum albumin.
602
  Y chromosome sperm are lighter than X chromosome 
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sperm.
603
  When sperm is filtered through human serum albumin, the differences in mass 
between the X and Y chromosomes result in the two sperm types separating.
604
  The end 
result is separated layers of concentrated X chromosome and Y chromosome sperm.
605
  
The resulting layers have higher concentrations of X chromosome or Y chromosome 
sperm but are not pure.
606
  The Y chromosome concentrated layer is used for 
insemination if a male is desired and is effective 70-75% of the time.
607
  The X 
chromosome concentrated layer is used for insemination if a female is desired and is 
effective 70-72% of the time.
608
 
 Other, potentially more accurate, sperm sorting systems are in development.  The 
MicroSort System has been approved for use on livestock and is now under FDA testing 
for approval in humans.  The foundation of the MicroSort System is the same as the 
Ericsson test.  It functions because the X chromosome has 2.8% more DNA material than 
the Y chromosome.
609
  The sperm is stained with a fluorescent that attaches to DNA.
610
  
"The stained spermatozoa are analyzed one by one by a flow cytometer, where cells go 
through a laser that makes the stain attached to the DNA fluoresce.  The spermatozoa 
containing the X chromosome (which have more DNA and therefore more stain) will 
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have a bigger shine than the spermatozoa containing the Y chromosome."
611
  The sperm 
are then sorted and a choice can be made between using X chromosome or Y 
chromosome sperm.
612
  The purity levels range from 91-93% for females and 74-82% for 
males.
613
 
 Another method involves in vitro fertilization and prenatal genetic diagnosis.
614
  
Ovum are removed from the mother and fertilized.
615
  The ovum are then separated and 
cultivated.
616
  When the ovum has developed six to eight cells, DNA can be removed for 
genetic diagnostic testing.
617
  The testing can provide information for any genetic 
abnormalities and can also identify if the fertilized ovum contains a Y chromosome.
618
  
The ovum that contains the selected sex can then be implanted.
619
  The process is more 
precise than the Ericsson method because the implanted ovum has been identified as 
either containing or not containing a Y chromosome.
620
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SECTION 2. 
The History of Ethical Approaches to Sex Selection 
 A series of multidisciplinary groups have examined the ethical dimensions of sex 
selection.  Reviewing these ethical approaches provides a fuller understanding of the 
current moral frameworks and the way anticipatory governance and sex equality can 
provide depth to the ethical debate. 
A.  The Hastings Group 
 In 1979, the New England Journal of Medicine published Guidelines for the 
Ethical, Social and Legal Issues in Prenatal Diagnosis — A Report from the Genetics 
Research Group of the Hastings Center, Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life 
Sciences.
621
  This collaborative project focused on the bioethical concerns associated with 
prenatal diagnosis including sex.  The interdisciplinary team included scholars from the 
fields of biology, genetics, law, medicine, philosophy, and theology.  The group 
concluded that prenatal sex diagnosis was justifiable in an effort to prevent genetic 
disorders, but was guarded about sex selection more broadly.  The group cautioned 
against "making diagnosis of sex and selective abortion a part of ordinary medical 
practice and family planning."
622
  Yet they recommended against legal restrictions on 
prenatal sex diagnosis.  "We think such restrictions would be ineffective and impossible 
to administer, would lead to subterfuge and, more important, would violate our objective 
of noninterference with parental choice, even when we disagree with that choice."
623
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 The Hastings Group settled on a position that placed an emphasis on individual 
liberty.  In particular the Hastings Group focused on the liberty of the parents to make 
choices about diagnosis and the sex of their child.  The Hastings Group placed their 
position in a "moral framework favoring the protection of individual choice and the 
autonomy of parents, even when we disagree with their courses of action."
624
  The liberty 
framework took center stage in their argument.  They did not engage in a larger analysis 
of the ethical situation surrounding sex diagnosis or selection.  
B. The President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems of Medicine 
 In 1983 Morris B. Abram Chairman of the President’s Commission for the Study 
of Ethical Problems of Medicine, wrote Screening and Counseling for Genetic 
Conditions: The Ethical, Social, and Legal Implications of Genetic Screening, 
Counseling, and Education Programs.
625
  The paper focused on various approaches to 
pre- and post-natal genetic testing and the ethical implications of engaging in this type of 
testing, including whether these practices ought to be precluded or if there ought to be 
ethical guidelines for practice.  As part of the larger paper, the Commission focused on 
the ethics of using amniocentesis
626
 for purposes of sex selection. 
 The Commission generally favored a liberty-based pluralistic view of genetic 
screening.  “Nowhere is the need for freedom to pursue divergent conceptions of the 
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good more deeply felt than in decisions concerning reproduction.”627  The Commission 
nonetheless was concerned that social pressures may influence a parent to terminate a 
pregnancy if a fetus were diagnosed with a genetic disorder.  So, the Commission urged 
caution: “It would be a cruel irony, therefore, if technological advances undertaken in the 
name of providing information to expand the range of individual choice resulted in 
unanticipated social pressures to pursue a particular course of action. Someone who feels 
compelled to undergo screening or to make particular reproductive choices at the urging 
of health care professionals or others or as a result of implicit social pressure is deprived 
of the choice-enhancing benefits of the new advances.”628  But, the Commission took 
occasion to specifically examine the “special case of sex selection.”  The Commission 
outlined “several reasons that using amniocentesis and abortion for this purpose is 
morally suspect.”629   
 First, the Commission was concerned with perpetuating sex discrimination when 
sex equality was of particular concern.  They feared that sex selection may lead to more 
parents opting to have males and thus increasing inequality.  The explanation for the 
resulting inequality was, “the selection of sons in preference to daughters would be yet 
another means of assigning greater social value to one sex over the other and of 
perpetuating the historical discrimination against women.” 630 
 Notably, this objection appears to have switched the causal arrows.  The presence 
of inequality and bias would cause the preference for males over females.  The choice 
itself would be a manifestation of that bias in the preference of males.    
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 Second, the Commission concluded that sex selection runs counter to the need for 
parents to love their child unconditionally.  Sex-selective abortion is “incompatible with 
the attitude of virtually unconditional acceptance that developmental psychologists have 
found to be essential to successful parenting.”631  The argument centers on the need to 
develop parents who are committed to the well-being of their child regardless of the 
child’s sex.  “For the good of all children, society’s efforts should go into promoting the 
acceptance of each individual—with his or her particular strengths and weaknesses—
rather than reinforcing the negative attitudes that lead to rejection.”632  The argument 
underpins a position that moves toward a sex-equality position.  Regardless of a child’s 
sex a parent ought to love the child.  If a parent is selecting the child’s sex, the parent is 
indicating that they would love a child of the selected sex more than a child of the 
opposite sex.  Although the Commission does not fully connect these dots, the underlying 
assumption in their position is that a parent who would select one sex over another is 
more likely to be unfit because that choice indicates that the parent might not 
unconditionally love the child.  But, the second objection also contains a kernel of the 
real issue underlying sex selection--  that a child, regardless of sex or gender, ought to be 
accepted as an individual.   
 Third, the Commission contends that sex selection may be a slippery slope to 
selecting a myriad of other identifiable genetic characteristics.  The Commission 
expressed fears that sex selection “may also rest on the very dubious notion that virtually 
any characteristic of an expected child is an appropriate object of appraisal and 
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selection.”633  The slippery slope would lead to designer children with each attribute 
selected based on preferences and socially desirable attributes.  “Taken to an extreme, 
this attitude treats a child as an artifact and the reproductive process as a chance to design 
and produce human beings according to parental standards of excellence, which over 
time are transformed into collective standards.”634 
 Two criticisms are wed in this position.  First, genetic selection procedures could 
take over the natural genetic selection process, an argument tantamount to doctors 
"playing god."  Second, genetic selection leads to the production of children based on 
desired attributes, a concern referential to Nazi Germany’s desire to produce genetically 
superior children.     
 The Commission felt that genetic screening could be divided into two categories, 
“a distinction can be made between seeking genetic information in order to correct or 
avoid unambiguous disabilities or to improve the well-being of a fetus, and seeking such 
information merely to satisfy parental preferences that are not only idiosyncratic but also 
unrelated to the good of the fetus.”635  The Commission concluded that “sex selection 
appears to fall in the latter class.”636  The Commission refrained from concluding that all 
sex selection was a cause for “serious moral concern.”  The Commission instead 
concluded that, “although individual physicians are free to follow the dictates of 
conscience, public policy should discourage the use of amniocentesis for sex selection.”  
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The Commission disfavored a legal prohibition because it would be ineffective, would 
require invasions of privacy, and could lead to coercive practices.    
 
C.  The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists 
 In 1996, the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) 
through their Committee on Ethics issued an opinion on the use of prenatal sex diagnostic 
techniques and sex selection. 
637
  The ACOG determined that sex selection was only 
permissible to avoid sex-linked genetic disorders.  It opposed diagnosis for any sex 
selection purposes or for family planning.  The ACOG was concerned that sex selection 
would perpetuate sex discrimination.  They have reaffirmed their position on two 
subsequent occasions and expanded the position to assert that, "[w]here systematic 
preferences for a particular sex dominate, there is a need to address underlying 
inequalities between the sexes."
638
  Nonetheless, the ACOG does not advocate legal 
mechanisms to stop these practices and even notes that doctors are not responsible for the 
conduct of patients who indicate non-sex-selection reasons to obtain sex diagnosis and 
sex selection procedures (such as diagnosis for genetic abnormalities).
639
  In addition, the 
ACOG does not develop a framework or strategy for combating the underlying sexism 
they believe is at the heart of sex selection.  
D.  The International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics 
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 In 1997 the International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) 
rejected sex-selection abortion contending that "no fetus should be sacrificed because of 
its sex alone."
640
  But FIGO held a different view regarding preconception sex selective 
practices.  "[P]reconceptional sex selection can be justified on social grounds in certain 
cases for the objective of allowing children of the two sexes to enjoy the love and care of 
parents."
641
  In subsequent years FIGO has altered this position.
642
  The most recent 
guideline notes that preconception sex selection through practices such as in vitro 
fertilization and prenatal genetic diagnosis or sperm separation “can also result in [sex] 
discrimination, in this respect they are not ethically different from those means used in 
ongoing pregnancy.”643 
 FIGO goes further than other quasi-governmental bodies and advocates for some 
level of regulatory practices.  FIGO indicates that “[p]rofessional societies must ensure 
that their members and their members’ staff are accountable for the employment of 
techniques for sex selection only for medical indications or purposes that do not 
contribute to social discrimination on the basis of sex or gender.”644 
 FIGO’s advocacy goes beyond a desire for self-regulation among practitioners by 
advocating legal mechanisms to regulate conduct.  “Where a regional area has a marked 
sex-ratio imbalance, the professional societies should work with their governments to 
ensure that sex selection is strictly regulated to contribute to the elimination of sex and 
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gender discrimination.”645  FIGO retains a liberty-based view of reproduction noting, 
“Procreative liberty warrants protection, except when its exercise results in sex 
discrimination. The individual right to procreative liberty needs to be balanced by the 
communal need to protect the dignity and equality of women and children.”646 
 FIGO’s position attempts to balance a liberty approach with a desire to combat 
sexism.  The concerns that they raise are directed toward sex selection as an act of 
discrimination and a need to preclude that act.  FIGO does however acknowledge that 
rooting out sex discrimination is important.  FIGO emphasizes that “all health 
professionals and their societies are under an obligation to advocate and promote 
strategies that will encourage and facilitate the achievement of gender and sex 
equality.”647  The statement appears to be broader than merely precluding sex selective 
practices, but it is unclear what the process may entail.    
E.  The American Society for Reproductive Medicine 
 In 1999 the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) issued a report 
critical of the use of prenatal genetic diagnosis as part of sex diagnosis and selection 
processes.
648
  ASRM outlined a series of reasons prenatal genetic diagnosis of sex was 
problematic: “issues of gender discrimination, the appropriateness of expanding control 
over nonessential characteristics of offspring, and the relative importance of sex selection 
when weighed against medical and financial burdens to parents and against multiple 
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demands for limited medical resources.”649  These arguments are connected to a series of 
consequences that may arise in the context of sex diagnosis, “such as risk of 
psychological harm to sex-selected offspring (i.e., by placing on them too high 
expectations), increased marital conflict over sex-selective decisions, and reinforcement 
of gender bias in society as a whole . . . an overall change in the human sex ratio 
detrimental to the future of a particular society.” 650 
 Despite these concerns, the ASRM noted that the use of prenatal genetic diagnosis 
was permissible if the process were used to identify serious genetic diseases because, “It 
is not inherently gender biased, bears little risk of consequences detrimental to 
individuals or to society, and represents a use of medical resources for reasons of human 
health.”651  ASRM discourages the use of prenatal genetic diagnosis for sex selection 
purposes.  They caution that in vitro fertilization and prenatal genetic diagnosis may also 
provide sex information as a byproduct of selecting out genetic abnormalities.   
 ASRM discourages the use of prenatal genetic diagnosis, arguing that a prenatal 
genetic diagnosis that provides sex information could be used for sex selection.  If 
information about a child's sex can be obtained as a byproduct of other testing, such 
testing “should not be encouraged.”652  ASRM struggles with establishing a clear line 
between what is objectionable and what is not objectionable.  In part, there is hesitation 
because ASRM supports individual liberty in reproductive health.  “It must be 
recognized, of course, that individuals and couples have wide discretion and liberty in 
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making reproductive choices, even if others object.”653  ASRM also acknowledges the 
possibility that there may be nonbiased reasons for sex selection, but maintains a view 
that bias may underpin these desires.  “For example, desires for family gender balance or 
birth order, companionship, family economic welfare, and the ready acceptance of 
offspring who are more 'wanted' because their gender is selected may not in every case 
deserve the charge of unjustified gender bias, but they are vulnerable to it.”654  Given 
ASRM’s cautious approach, they recommend against legislative limits on prenatal 
genetic diagnosis or sex selection.  “However, because it is not clear in every case that 
the use of PGD and sex selection for nonmedical reasons entails certainly grave wrongs 
or sufficiently predictable grave negative consequences, the Committee does not favor its 
legal prohibition.”655 
F.  The President's Council on Bioethics 
 In 2001 President George W. Bush formed the President's Council on Bioethics.  
The Council was formed “to advise the President on bioethical issues related to advances 
in biomedical science and technology.  In connection with its advisory role, the Council 
undertakes fundamental inquiry into the human and moral significance of developments 
in biomedical and behavioral science and technology, with the aim of fostering greater 
understanding and public discussion of bioethical issues.”656  As part of the greater 
project of examining bioethical concerns, the Council examined questions surrounding 
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sex selection.  They released a staff working paper on the issues entitled Ethical Aspects 
of Sex Control. 
657
 
 The Council argued that sex selection was not grounded in reproductive liberty 
concerns.  The Council explains that a liberty-based view seeks to establish sex selection 
as a choice between the binary of male or female.  “But the binary choice among highly 
natural and familiar types hardly makes the choice a trivial one.”658  From the perspective 
of the Council the decision has a significant meaning.  Male or female makes an indelible 
mark on the child, a decision that should not be taken lightly.  “[H]aving one's sex 
foreordained by another is different from having it determined by the lottery of sexual 
union.”659  The contention appears to be that there is a distinction between the natural 
selective process, where a child’s sex is determined by sexual intercourse where either 
the sperm that fertilizes the egg contains an X or a Y chromosome, and the process of 
unnatural sex selection, which includes practices like sperm sorting, prenatal genetic 
diagnosis, and sex-selective abortion.  The difference is sufficient to reject an argument 
that the decision to permit sex selection should be founded on reproductive liberty.  
“There is thus at least a prima facie case for suggesting that the power to foreordain or 
control the nature of one's child's sexual identity is not encompassed in the protected 
sphere of inviolable reproductive liberty.”660 
 The Council also rejects a critique of sex selection based on sex discrimination.  
The Council categorizes these arguments as “a movement toward a more genuinely 
genderless (or androgynous) society, one in which our socially constructed human 
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identities overwhelm the mere biology of sexual differentiation.”661  The view is then 
rejected as incoherent.  “But in the perfectly genderless society, it would presumably 
make no difference whether you are a girl or boy, a woman or a man.  And thus the 
choice of parents of a boy rather than a girl, or vice versa, would have no negative 
implications of gender stereotyping and would not threaten the equality of the sexes.”662  
The Council argues that a sex- or gender-based argument does not make sense because if 
the sex of a child does not matter, then sex selection should be permissible.  If the sex of 
the child does not matter, than selecting one sex over the other should not matter.   
 The issue with this argument is that it fails to explain why a parent would want to 
select a particular sex, if sex no longer matters.  Presumably, if sex were no longer a 
societal issue, the sex of your child would not be relevant, and thus, no one would want to 
select a child’s sex.  Ironically, the Council holds the position that if sex were irrelevant, 
then the decision would be based on aesthetic preference.  “In the genderless utopia, the 
choice between a girl and a boy is purely an aesthetic choice – a choice between pink and 
blue.”663  The problem with this position is that the assumption that a child belongs in 
pink or blue is a profoundly gendered view.  Not only is the view gendered that male 
children belong in blue and female children belong in pink, but it also assumes that sex 
and gender are inherently linked.  Nonetheless, the Council argues that from a sex-
equality position this would render sex selection more permissible.  “And who could then 
object to letting parents choose that [between blue and pink]?  The very logic and 
language of gender equality would seem to soften opposition to sex control.”664   
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 The Council’s view is that a sex-equality perspective is either unhelpful or 
counterproductive.  The Council argues that sex is fixed and meaningful.  In addition, 
their argument also rests on the view that sex and gender are bound and dimorphic.  
“Humanity exists as a sexually differentiated species; it is constituted in part by the 
sexual differentiation.”665  The Council believes that a sexed body is real and important.  
“[O]ne must say something like this if one takes seriously the body as integral to our 
humanity.  There is not some generic or androgynous human self to which is added, then, 
as a kind of accidental addition, either a female or a male body.”666  From this perspective 
sex matters and identity stems from sex.  “Were that the case [the existence of a generic 
or androgynous human self], sexual identity really would be ‘nonessential’ or 
‘inessential’ to our self.  It would not in any sense help to constitute a person's 
identity.”667  The presumption is that sex is an essential component of identity.  “Every 
cell of the body marks us as either male or female, and it is hard to imagine any more 
fundamental or essential characteristic of a person.  It is surely odd, to say the least, to 
deny the importance of sexual identity in the very activity of initiating a life!”668 
 The view that sex is fundamental to the identity of a child may appear to be a 
point of advocacy for sex selection.  But the Council believes that the high importance of 
sex is precisely why sex selection should be discouraged or prohibited.  Sex is so 
fundamental that even when parents do not want to know about the sex of their child, it is 
indicative of the important role the child's sex will play.  "Many prospective parents will 
say quite honestly that they don't care whether their baby is a boy or a girl; they'll be 
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happy to have either. That attitude is desirable not because the sex of the child is a matter 
for indifference but because it counts for so much."
669
  Sex is so important that human 
intervention is inappropriate.  Sex counts for "[f]ar too much to be seen as [the parents'] 
responsibility to determine."
670
  Sex selection challenges the natural order and 
undermines the very fabric of procreation.  "The salient fact about human procreation in 
its natural context is that children are not made but begotten.  By this we mean that 
children are the issue of our love, not the product of our wills."
671
  The Council also 
understands sex selection as the first step down a slippery slope to eugenics, a eugenics 
program that is just as dangerous in the hands of private individuals as government.  "It 
should be noted as well that sex control may be a step down the road of eugenics and 
'designer children.'  It is a short step, logically and psychologically if not technologically, 
from choosing the sex of our children to choosing their eye color, or skin color, or height, 
or sexual orientation, or IQ."
672
 
 The Council's hearings over these issues placed further emphasis on the indecency 
in sex selection.  The emphasis of many of the comments was on the undesirable rule of 
acting like god in interfering with sex selection.  Michael J. Sandel commented, "[T]he 
disposition or the character of the desire to control, to choose the sex of one's offspring . . 
. Maybe the short label is the hubris objection, something objectionable in the stance of 
the person who has the desire and acts on the desire to control the sex, to choose the sex 
of his or her offspring."
673
  The moral culpability in Sandel's view is with the parent who 
believes they have the right to select a child's sex.  Council Chairmen Leon Kass takes 
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the argument a step further than Sandel.  He noted, "[O]ne worries really about what it 
means not just to pray for a child of a certain sex, which doesn't necessarily produce the 
result because the Good Lord doesn't necessarily give you what you want, but there's a 
difference between that and actually having exercised the control over it and have the 
parents be responsible to the child for the choice made."
674
   
 
SECTION 3. 
A Sex Equality Anticipatory Governance Model for Sex Selection 
 The traditional ethical perspectives on sex selection focus on two main issues: 
reproductive liberty interests and the composite dangers of sex selection.  The few 
approaches that treat sex selection as related to sex discrimination tend to focus on sex 
selection as an act of discrimination.  The various multidisciplinary groups examined 
above are taking anticipatory governance steps but are limiting themselves with the scope 
of governance strategies that they pursue.  An anticipatory governance model ought to be 
open to various approaches and strategies to dealing with ethical dilemmas in science and 
technology.      
 An anticipatory governance approach can address issues in a manner that attempts 
to resolve the issue from multiple vantage points.  In this case, the root concern, and the 
underlying issue with sex selection is a concern that the practice is sexist.  Even when the 
decision is made for personal reasons, the decision is predicated on a preference for 
certain sex and gender attributes.  If we can eliminate the attributes associated with a 
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particular sex or gender than we reduce those sex and gender related reasons for engaging 
in sex selection. 
 A more direct solution to issues with sex selection can be obtained by focusing on 
the causes of sex selection.   One can see that the stronger the gender roles and the more 
connected they are with sex, the more likely parents are to favor one sex over the other.  
In the vast majority of cases, this results in favoring male children over female children.  
Combating the process of sex selection, rather the technology or the moral ambiguities of 
using the technology, ought to focus on the sex and gender discrimination that results in 
these biases.   
 First, we need to address sex biases.  By eliminating sex-based barriers to entry 
into various occupations, we can increase opportunities for females and reduce inequity.  
The greatest strides can be made in the developing world where restrictions may include 
the right to own property or the right to work a wide variety of jobs.  But, such 
discrepancies also exist in the developed world.  In the United States, for example, 
females were excluded from combat positions until 2013.  Even with the change in 
policy, the military is only opening up some positions to both sexes for now.  By 
reducing the number of professional and financial obstacles in place for females, we will 
reduce the financial burden of having female children.   
 Opening up more positions is not sufficient.  We must also work to obtain pay 
equity.  A system that ensures equal wages for equal work will further reduce the 
economic disparity between having a female or male child.  While we may imagine sex 
discrimination as being far removed for contemporary reality, unfortunately these issues 
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persist.  Lilly Ledbetter’s case highlighted the persistence of unequal pay.675  After she 
lost her case before the United States Supreme Court she continued to work for legal 
remedies for pay discrimination until the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was passed in 
2009.
676
    
 Second, we need to work on societal shifts in the gender roles foisted on males 
and females.  Providing females the opportunity to work in military combat positions is 
insufficient, if it is not accompanied with the view that women can serve in such 
positions.  For example, a higher percentage of women than men graduate with a 
bachelor’s degree in the United States,677 the same is true of a doctoral degree,678 but 
women are still underrepresented and underpaid in the hard sciences and engineering.
679
  
 In addition, we need to work to eradicate limiting gender roles.  The view that the 
man is the provider and bread winner and women are meant to stay at home limits the 
opportunities for women to become financially independent.  The possibility of financial 
independence for women will reduce the view that male children are necessary to ensure 
the financial success of a family.  In a similar vein, eliminating dowry systems and male 
inheritance systems will also reduce the benefit of having a male child and the burden of 
having a female child.            
 Reducing sex and gender discrimination will reduce the need for sex selection, 
because the sex of a child becomes less relevant if a child is not limited by their sex.  By 
combating both sex and gender discrimination we can also work to decouple sex and 
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gender and further erode the perceived need for sex selection.  Eliminating this dimorphic 
connection and reducing disparities between males and females is essential to reducing 
the need and desire for sex selection.   
 Embracing the various approaches to regulating or restricting sex selection also 
illuminates the important role that anticipatory governance can take in addressing 
scientific innovation.  The various models presented highlight why examining the ethical, 
social, and political dimensions of technology is important.  Analyzing this work helps to 
highlight where governance may be needed and the ways in which regulation is 
ineffective and ill-conceived.  The anticipatory governance framework provides a way to 
analyze issues more fully and examine various approaches to eliminating issues that 
advancing technologies may raise in the future.     
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